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Policy professionals would benefit from a social theory capable of suggesting policy 
change ramifications prior to public implementation. There is a research analysis shortfall 
concerning the usefulness of elite theory in modern social change. This study was an 
investigation of the effectiveness of elite theory to inform public policy analysts of 
behavioral outcomes following policy creation or change. Elite theory is the theoretical 
foundation that guided the framework of this study. The research question examined the 
effectiveness of elite theory to suggest behavioral outcomes in response to reduced 
personal privacy due to domestic government surveillance. A correlational research 
design was integrated with a thematic methodology to analyze 8,223 secondary data 
points obtained from a randomized sample of 1,537 adult, English speaking panel 
participants across the United States from the years 2013 through 2015. Selective coding 
using key word, key phrase, and subject matter matching was employed to assign 
categorical values to panel responses about privacy and personal behavior. Themes were 
identified and triangulated with themes regarding privacy and behavior that emerged 
from the literature that was reviewed. The results indicated that individuals have strongly 
held beliefs regarding privacy but do not undertake sustained behavior to protect it. The 
results point to an alignment with elite theory suggesting that the social theory may be 
used in policy development. This research is significant for both government policy 
professionals and grassroots social change organizers as they navigate the potential 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Generally, public policy refers to a system of decision making by the state from 
which laws and actionable strategies are promulgated upon the public to address some 
identified issue in society; public policy is government policy that affect the whole 
population (Merriam-Webster., n.d.). In the United States, national security policy is a 
broadly defined phrase that is rooted in the overarching need to protect the structure, 
integrity, and framework of the state as well as the physical security of the citizens 
therein (Aftergood, 2012). National security policy is initially formed by federal agencies 
such as the National Security Council (NSC), and the Homeland Security Council that 
advise the President who makes policy decisions. (Whittaker, 2011). Policy is ultimately 
implemented through a regulatory framework created by and interpreted by the three 
separate and distinct branches of government.  
Governmental policy touches on virtually every aspect of life including food, 
education, healthcare, personal access to goods and services, domestic law enforcement, 
national defense, and individual privacy through the implantation of laws, administrative 
codes, and local ordinances. Policy development on a national level results from the 
federal government’s internal planning and response to an actual or perceived threat, 
social need, or requirement of government. This includes public health, civil order, 




Following the terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, policy experts 
were faced with a challenging new group of responsibilities both domestically and 
abroad. In the decade following the attacks, international security threats morphed from a 
predominately physical risk of attack like those occurring on 9/11, to bioweapon and 
epidemiological attacks, cyber-attacks, infrastructure failures, data hacks, and direct or 
indirect foreign influence campaigns. To combat this new terrorist paradigm, defense 
policy shifted in large part from a boots-on-ground approach to a more complex 
information-based 22 agency defense network capable of identifying terror threats in 
their pre-execution phase (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017).  
Humans require safety in their everyday lives second only to physiological needs 
like air and water. (Maslow, 1954). However, inherence to information-based safety 
policy is often a tradeoff wherein security becomes more robust at the expensive of 
increased data aggregation and the diminishment of individual civil liberties (Eidam, 
2017). Citizen data donors may not be consciously aware of or involved in the data 
aggregation network that underlies data surveillance programs. Government data mining 
is most often accomplished through nontransparent mechanisms and third-party 
commercial data venders that are associated with social media, tele-communications, and 
private utility companies (Leetaru, 2019).  
Even those individuals generally resistant to data sharing in a perceived low-
threat environment may choose purposeful data donation when they believe they are in a 
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high-risk threat environment believing it may move them from a higher to a lower risk 
state. Even when individuals are aware that their data will be shared with the government, 
they are often unaware why, how, or to whom the data is ultimately being provide (see 
Pew research datasets below).  
The relationship between high and low risk states may be described as a secure-
freedom continuum. Many individuals will exchange degrees of safety and security along 
this continuum for rights and freedoms including privacy. In the human hierarchy of 
needs safety is paramount (Maslow, 1954). National security policy professionals and 
legislators are challenged to position the population in the safety continuum such that 
society will achieve an acceptable balance of safety, privacy, and freedom.  
The social effects of security policy changes may not be known during the policy 
creation stage and it is not until they are implemented, with social feedback generated 
and analyzed that determinations of effectiveness can be understood. There are only a 
few mechanisms available to policy professionals that assist them in intelligently 
choosing one policy creation scenario over another with some level of outcome-based 
certainty. Individuals tasked with obtaining policy objectives may benefit from an 
additional theoretical model capable of assisting with predicate outcomes of collateral 
social consequences. If a reliable outcome-based theory could be implemented at the 




One potentially useful theoretical tool for suggesting future social behavior is elite 
theory. Elite theorists suggest that only a relatively small, elite sub-group of groups or 
individuals can make sound social policy decisions (Pareto, 1935). If this theory is 
accurate it could be applied to a variety of policy judgments and may allow for the virtual 
disregard of collateral social effects when forming initial policy strategy. I designed this 
study to test the hypothesis that elite theory may be employed as a tool for understanding 
social change. I am not aware of another study designed to inform scholars whether elite 
theory may be an instrument of social policy analysis.  
My study used public awareness of the United States government’s domestic data 
surveillance and eavesdropping program to evaluate individuals’ reaction in response to 
threats against a civil liberty (privacy), and to determine whether there is a relationship 
between the two. I examined if elite theory may be useful as an analysis component 
during initial drafting of security policy. The result of this study may provide insight into 
the viability of adopting elite theory as a modern tool applicable to the creation and 
analysis of other national security policy.  
This first chapter will serve to establish the significance of the research, introduce 
the reader to the content in the remainder of the study, discuss important terms, explain 
assumptions, and identify possible limitations of the study. A thematic analytical 
approach is used to synthesize different types of scholarly literature, pre-existing studies, 
and publicly sourced secondary data to offer a perspective not previously available to 
policy professionals.  
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Statement of the Problem 
In the aftermath of 9/11, policy makers across the nation were confronted with the 
task of protecting the American public from exposure to catastrophic attacks in the future. 
The methods used by terrorists on 9/11 drew attention to a different tactic of terrorism not 
previously encountered on such a scale. The terror offensive used civilian aircraft as 
guided weapons achieving a high fatality ratio on domestic soil and it became clear that 
this form of terrorism could not be neutralized by conventional wartime tactics as there 
was no direct state actors involved. Instead, nonlinear dynamic defense strategies would 
have to be created to meet the new threat. This would ultimately be accomplished not by 
using more munitions against the enemy but by using more information. Policy makers 
concluded that the most effective way to fight terror on American soil was to pre-
emptively prevent actions during their initial preattack phases. This could be 
accomplished through domestic and international offensive information campaigns but 
would require enormous quantities of data.  
An active participation and prevention strategy would require local law 
enforcement and federal government agencies to acquire, analyze, and share massive 
amounts of data on every individual in the country to stay one step ahead of terrorist 
planning and execution. Operationally, staying ahead requires unobstructed access to 
current, dynamically updated information regarding enemy access to planning and 
resources. Obtaining information on a scale large enough to be effective means creating a 
virtual digital fishing net capable of extracting and amassing enormous volumes of data 
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from the lives of hundreds of millions of individuals while simultaneously developing an 
algorithmic system robust enough to analyze and report on it in near real time. 
 With the integrating of proprietary government technologies and large 
private corporations’ access to individuals’ data, U.S. intelligence agencies were able to 
develop programs capable of obtaining and retaining incredibly large volumes data on 
American citizens including the Utah Data Center (UDC) which is said to be capable of 
storing over 5 zettabytes of private information on individuals; equivalent to 100 years of 
worldwide communication (Berkes, H. 2013). Although this could yield information 
potentially useful to predict and prevent future terror attacks (albeit with debatable 
effectiveness), the capability came at a price paid in privacy. The fundamental challenge 
to policy makers is to balance the security requirements of the government while 
anticipating the collateral social consequence associated with a specific policy. If it were 
possible to employ a policy proposal mechanism prior to policy implementation then 
legislators and analysts could focus on policies that would be effective while 
simultaneously not producing unanticipated implementation results. I was not able to find 
literature addressing this specific subject and so the potential for using elite theory as a 
model was worth considering.  
This study was designed to address a gap in the literature by examining the 
relationship between domestic government surveillance programs (the independent 
variable), and changes in individual protective privacy behavior (the dependent variable). 
The results could inform policy scholars and advisors on whether a program may or may 
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not be implemented with anticipation of social repercussions. This knowledge would 
assist policy professionals as they craft new policy or modify existing policy to satisfy 
national security goals.  
Purpose of the Study 
This study was designed to evaluate the potential relationship between the 
independent variable (government-sanctioned reductions of the civil liberty personal 
privacy), and the dependent variable (society’s individual privacy-protective behavior in 
consideration of the government’s known domestic monitoring programs). The study was 
undertaken following my realization that no other found research has directly addressed 
whether elite theory could be used to suggest social response following governmental 
policy action. 
The research result could suggest whether elite theory may be useful in current 
national security policy analysis. The study is designed to test the hypothesis that elite 
theory is a reliable indicator of how the United States’ population may behave in 
response to a forced reduction in civil liberty (privacy) and by extension to other aspects 
of changed social policy.  
Elite theorists suggest that a nonelite population is largely apathetic to [national 
security] policy and is devoid of sustained investment in the protection of individual 
privacy rights (Pareto, 1935). I was unable to locate any other study that suggests whether 
elite theory may be used to evaluate social change outcomes. This study was undertaken 
to fill that void in the literature. The research will assist security policy makers, analysts, 
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and academics in their understanding of how elite theory may be used as a modern policy 
tool capable of describing social change outcomes.  
Research Question 
 I sought to understand whether there is a relationship between knowledge of the 
government’s secret domestic spy programs and subsequent changes in individual 
behavior in response to it. The study independent variable (IV) was the public knowledge 
of government covert domestic personal data collection programs and the dependent 
variable (DV) was the individual behavior-based social response to it. 
These variables were analyzed alongside Pew research secondary datasets using 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to identify relationships 
between the variables. Effect size and trend information are also considered when 
determining significance and strength of any relationship identified. The research 
question and testable hypothesis is as follows: 
RQ1: Using existing studies and secondary data; what is the nature of the 
relationship among the independent variable (domestic government monitoring) and the 
dependent variable (individual protective behavior)? 
H01: There is a positive and significant relationship between the independent 
variable (domestic government monitoring), and the dependent variable 
(individual protective behavior). 
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Ha1: There is no significant relationship between the independent variable 
(domestic government monitoring), and the dependent variable (individual 
protective behavior). 
Conceptional Framework 
The methodology used to evaluate this question is based on elite theory and used 
both thematic analysis and secondary datasets facilitating a quantitative examination of 
the hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between the variables, domestic 
government monitoring and individual protective behavior.  
A thematic analysis of several prior research studies was used to inform my 
analysis of Pew research data sets providing broad access to a large sample population 
not otherwise available in consideration of financial and logistical constraints while at the 
same time offering a concise evaluation of whether a population will respond to 
surveillance. Chapter 3 will outline the datasets provided by Pew research and the 
methodology used to choose the informational elements included in the statistical 
analysis. Statistical information from the Pew datasets will be combined with a thematic 
analysis of existing scholarship and legal caselaw to provide a robust research result.  
Single slice and multiple instance data from Pew were combined with scholarly 
articles and journals providing the reader with an understanding of the data in an 
overarching context. Datasets were selected using a specific criterion developed for use 




 The following assumptions were necessary for this study because there were no 
reasonable ways to independently verify the veracity or eliminate assumptions of quality 
of the data. Deductive thematic analysis using a latent approach applied to multiple 
source research may in a more valid and more useful result than a single source option 
would have. The Pew data was assumed to be accurate and the participants honest in their 
answers. The data was assumed to be acquired using a proper and scientifically sound 
technique according to the methods indicated by the Pew research survey methodology 
(Pew, 2020).  
Limitations 
There may be limitations associated with sample-based studies that use 
structured-question data (normally associated with quantitative data collection methods), 
that exclude the flexibility associated with (qualitative) open-ended questions. Research 
limitations may also include constraints on the generalization and future applicability of 
the research results that have been produced from a finite, self-reporting sample 
population.  
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden University preapproved the plan 
for my research under approval number 08-17-18-0512335 ensuring that the assumptions 
and modeling were designed within the appropriate limitations of hypothesis testing 
acceptable for an academic paper. This ensured not only that the research was ready for 
publication but that it was suitable for use in future studies as well.  
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Significance of the Study 
Drafting and fine-tuning public policy in a way that fulfills the requirements of 
national security while simultaneously integrating into a social construct and a pre-
existing legislative framework may be challenging. There may be social and political 
implications associated with any policy decision but those associated with national 
security may rank among the most important in constituent value and public concern. The 
research presented in this paper is significant because the result addressed these 
challenges and provided national security professionals with an understanding necessary 
to mitigate predictive challenges associated with creation and implementation of national 
security policy. The potential effect of this research with respect to social change may be 
profound.  
If policy advisors can predict how a society or subvariant will behave in response 
to policy change then the implementation of policy will no longer be susceptible to 
reactionary unknows. Rather, policy makers may be able to predetermine responses and 
craft domestic policy with relative impunity and with the knowledge that their decisions 
will ultimately be accepted by society. This study may broaden the policy communities’ 
understanding of how theory informs policy development and how policy professionals 
may take advantage of that relationship.  
Summary 
This research study was necessary to assist policy experts facing security 
challenges that require predictable strategies for achieving policy objectives. The 
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research allows analysts to review cause and effect relationships necessary to make 
predictions that assist in the policy drafting and implementation process. The design uses 
Pew research data obtained through structured data-collection techniques and uses 
statistical analysis to show the response of a national population. Chapter 2 of this study 
explains how thematic analysis of existing research is used to provide context and 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Meaningful social change may benefit from the creation and implementation of 
newly formed social policies effecting society at both the national and individual level. 
Drafting new social policy without predictable outcomes creates a challenge for policy 
professionals. They are left to guess how policy changes could affect populations far into 
the future. Policy experts may also need to account for the potential of collateral social 
consequences not intended by the primary policy goal. For example, a social policy 
requiring gun owners to register their firearms may primarily offer safety related benefits 
but may also be construed as an unconstitutional infringement of second amendment 
rights resulting in reduced compliance and increased government distrust.  
The use of a social theory as a screening tool for proposed policy changes prior to 
implementation of those changes may be useful in mitigating collateral consequences. As 
a theoretical tool social-theory constructs may be included in the framework of a 
proposed policy and potentially used to suggest outcomes. Foresight into how a new 
policy will render over time may be invaluable to those tasked with creating it and may 
help to protect social structures from undesirable collateral changes.  
Pareto described the elite theory social construct as social representation of a 
nonelite general population that is unable or unwilling to produce more desirable social 
outcomes than those in the elite class (Pareto, 1935). This paper examined whether there 
the theory may be used to suggest population behavior. If elite theory operating as a 
14 
 
policy analysis tool can provide social forecasting then it may prove to be a critical 
component in the creation of social change. 
In this study I investigated whether there is a significant relationship between 
changes in perceptions about privacy and changes in individual privacy behavior. A 
relationship between these variables may signal the appropriate use of elite theory as a 
tool for informing policy makers of a population’s future action prior to policy 
implementation.  
I examined elite theory as applied in a post-9/11 security paradigm wherein there 
is a bipolar relationship between personal privacy and governmental intrusiveness. The 
post-9/11 environment in conjunction with leaked top-secret intelligence information 
provided a unique window of opportunity for research into government data monitoring 
programs and the effects they may produce in society. This research is important because 
national security policy touches every individual in the United States population. The 
ability to predict policy outcomes may be important to ensure that a proposed social 
change will benefit society or result in conformance with the primary intent of those 
implementing it. 
Literature Relevance 
The timing of this study was relevant because government mass monitoring 
programs are by nature highly secretive and the classified materials needed to understand 
them are not normally available to the public, academics, or nongovernment analysists 
(Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). However, following several prominent leaks of 
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top-secret information into the public domain beginning in 2013 (Sottek & Kopfstein, 
2013), academics and private citizens were offered insight into some of the government’s 
secret data collection programs and the associated policy strategies that the government 
had chosen to use.  
I found research referencing privacy and elite theory to be compartmentalized and 
not addressing the usefulness of elite theory as a predictor of social policy outcomes in a 
modern population. This research study was necessary to better understand that 
relationship and to accurately assess elite theory as a potential policy tool. I addressed 
this topic within a holistic framework so that the reader may be better able to integrate 
theory with practice than would be otherwise be possible. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature review was undertaken to provide scholars and policy creators with 
a contextual framework from within which to understand the underlying components of 
privacy and surveillance discussed in this study. It was a jumping off point designed to 
provide readers with a predigested review of existing information related to the topics 
analyzed in the study.  
Using information obtained from legal cases, historical documents, media 
sources, and peer reviewed journals this review provided a synthesized understanding of 
the how privacy is defined, what government mass monitoring in the United States looks 




The theoretical foundation for this study was elite theory. Social theorists have 
tried to explain the function and phenomena of societies and modern social science 
appears to finds its roots in interdisciplinary social theory. Individual social theories vary 
in both depth and breadth as they attempt to explain everything from the nature of an 
individual’s behavior in society to a broad accounting for why entire populations behave 
as they do. The most recent trends include the adaptation and merging of multiple 
theories (to the exclusion of single theory explanations), to explain how a society will 
function (Webber, 1968). It is life experience and a personal orientation disfavoring 
elitism and privilege that brings me to the social construct of elite theory. I have tried to 
develop an overarching understanding of national security, government function, and 
social policy in order to present the topics in a coherent, research driven paper that may 
help others understand it as well.  
A better understanding of elite theory may support policy decision making by 
equipping researchers with a theoretical basis from which they can analyze policy. Elite 
theorist may seek to describe the relationship of a population’s power distribution in 
specific societal contexts and the decision-making powers that flow from that relationship 
may provide broad applicability to policy review in consideration of the current social 
backdrop in the United States.  
Elite theory may offer a parallel explanation describing the differences between 
those in power and those in nonpower positions in society. Elite theory appears broader 
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and more applicable than periphery concepts like asymmetrical power structures, a state 
of exception, counter laws, or sovereignty double-speak (Morwood, 2012).  
As a social concept elite theory may explain the counterintuitive relationship 
demonstrated by a society that appears to assign high value to individual privacy while 
simultaneously acquiescing to the dissolution of basic privacy protections. Although the 
effectiveness of applying elite theory may be questionable in other nations like Russia, 
North Korea, or China where the top-down political power structure is different than in 
America, the theory appears valid for use in this study because of an inherent accounting 
for the structure, form, and function of the quasi-democratic political system and diverse 
social makeup of the population of the United States.  
Elite theorist posited that a small subsection of society (designated as elites or 
chosen ones) will inevitably control the affairs of the public (López, 2013). Ideologically, 
this may be because the traits of those most suited to govern (wealth, stature, intelligence, 
power, etc.) are distributed to only a small fraction of potential leaders. The theorists 
suggest that the remainder of the populous is uninformed, incapable of making policy 
decisions, or prone to anarchy and civil disturbance (López, 2013). Historically, the 
theory may be described in several variations including cost, crisis, and lack of 
willpower.  
The idea of an uninformed public that is described by elitism may closely parallel 
other historical theories of public disconnect relating to civil policy. In 1957, Downs 
(2003) first spoke of the nonelite’s rational ignorance. The theory conforms to the idea 
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that the public will avoid the purchase of knowledge or information (when it has a cost 
associated with it), because the public does not believe the cost will outweigh the benefit 
to them (e.g. that their vote could realistically impact an election, or a restriction on freely 
available information would materially affect their lives, (Downs, 2003). 
Years before Downs’ (1957) work, Lippmann (1922) opined that the public is 
apathetic, uninformed, and careless in their perceptions. Lippmann suggested a more 
modern yet parallel social theory that described public opinion as forming around crisis 
and subsequently fading over time. Lippmann’s work argued that the public exhibit this 
absence of informed opinion due to a disinterest and lack of will to engage the time and 
resources required to be informed (Lippmann, 1922). 
In 2016, Somin (2016) laid out a background explaining the long history of 
assumed ignorance by the public when it comes to politics and national policy and 
described the potential threat that it poses to democracy. Somin wrote that because 
individuals can not directly impact elections it is rational to assume that there is no 
incentive in becoming an informed voter despite acknowledging that this would 
potentially result in an unwanted outcome at the collective level (Somin, 2016). 
Ignorance of policy and related decision making may not mean uninformed 
individuals cannot or do not affect policy. Where government action is largely positive or 
negative and individuals can see and identify with such an action or event those 
individuals may vote accordingly irrespective of valid rationality. It may be that the result 
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of ignorant voting is to further policies allowing for the future manipulation of that 
ignorance by those elected (Somin, 2016). 
Elite theory may be described using multiple contextual components that have 
several related yet different meanings (Domhoff, 2010). Generally, elites may be those 
individuals or groups in a society that hold status, power, money, or other interest(s) in a 
greater quantity or strength than the rest of the population who are by necessity a 
majority. Interestingly, it may be possible for nonelites like the newly wealthy to 
overcome this neo-elite status and be assimilated into the traditional elites if offered the 
proper tools and context from within which to do so.  
Elite theory may best be understood as a flexible set of ideas capable of 
integrating different components into an overarching theory. For example, elitism may be 
used to describe characteristics of a democracy wherein the elite hold power but the 
population are those who are able to influence political policy making. This democratic 
example does not account for inherent differences among those making up the median.  
Gilens and Page (2014) explained that political elite groups may be diverse and 
include powerful special interest groups, lobbyists, Federal Advisory Committees (FAC), 
as well as the wealthy (or economic elite). In their research study, the authors point out 
that current views of the elite model include multiple elite sectors. While the most studied 
and referred to sector is the political elite there are also sectoring of elites in the military, 
religious, corporate, and other social environments (Gilens & Page, 2014). One may even 
envision the elite structure of a grade school playground wherein a power hierarchy 
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among the children plays out every day; one child is larger, one is more liked, another is 
smarter, and another may share candy to effect influence. These sectors may interact, 
compete, and influence one another at the elite levels of society.   
Domhoff  (2010) addressed these and other related issues in the example of a 
generalizable link between government officials, their economic backgrounds, stature, 
and distributed powers. Domhoff explored the FAC sector and its direct influence over 
policy. It was suggested that while the public has virtually no policy influence; it is a 
(mixed) theory of corporate, group, and individual elites that strongly influence policy 
(Domhoff, 2010). The Gilans et al. (2014) study of economic elites indicated that where a 
majority seeks to preserve the status quo of policy it is likely to be preserved. When a 
majority seeks to change the policy status quo but it is opposed by the elites it is unlikely 
to take place (Gilans, 2014).  
The neo-elite models consist of integrations and cohesive agreements among elite 
groups that can form into ‘elite settlements’ and the establishment of a new order (López, 
2013). Settlements may also be created because of stressors on the elites by nonelites 
over their interests (López, 2013). This is theorized to be the first step in elite 
convergence wherein the elites come together forming a functional, united political 
system (López, 2013). A failed example of this may be the United States’ attempt to 
democratize Iraq. That effort may have failed in part because the Iraqi elites were not 
able to realize this idealized formation.  
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Social inputs from nonelite population such as uprisings and poverty may also 
impact the elite function. The perception of social threat may be a necessary component 
in the continuation of stable democracies because it may pressure elites to allow nonelite 
input into the political system. That idea may also be applicable to elites’ tolerance levels 
for poverty. Poverty in the population may be considered desirable for elites or not 
desirable depending on the context and current prevailing social modeling of the involved 
country. For example, poverty may be a positive attribute if considering social dominance 
or providing cheap labor but may not be positive for preventing the spread of disease or 
the mitigating the proliferation of violence and threats against the elite due to social 
unrest or desire for social change. 
While there may be competing interests between the elite and nonelite 
populations, there does not appear to be a necessary divergence between the interests of 
the two. There may be circumstances where the interests of both converge and be a 
complementary goal of both groups like the desire for safety from nondomestic forces 
taking over the homeland. However, these congruencies appear to be the result of 
coincidental external circumstances and not a functional result of the theory itself.  
Whether or not elite theory can be used to explain a population’s response to 
government monitoring may be directly related to whether the population’s common 
social structure values privacy and to what degree. Much of this chapter was dedicated to 
understanding what privacy is and means. My research suggested that privacy may be 
considered a strongly held ideal for many Americans. Defining that ideal however 
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appears to be a concept that is curiously complex, nebulous, and difficult to define with 
certainty. The ambiguity may result in part because privacy seems to be describable only 
as it is being observed through different contextual lenses as outlined below. 
Understanding Privacy 
In his 1965 dissenting opinion penned under the Griswold v. Connecticut 
Supreme Court case; Justice Black described the issue of privacy as a, “broad, abstract 
and ambiguous concept” (Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 1965). Griswold 
represents the first and most seminal in a line of cases establishing the legal notion of 
privacy. Later cases continued to support the idea of legal protections of individual 
privacy establishing a virtual ‘right’ to privacy; simultaneously opening windows through 
which a judge’s pen could reach to carve out exceptions to that protection.  
Right to Privacy 
Traditionally, rights or quasi-rights like privacy may be thought of as being 
created by legislation. But in practice they may actually grow outwardly from the judicial 
system. It is the courts that offer individuals civil and criminal protections and it is the 
courts that restrict personal actions; thus, defining how a nation will describe its social 
boundaries. In the United States legal policy has historically supported a citizen’s ‘right’ 
to personal privacy. Individuals have had some protection from excessive government 
intrusion and overreaching into their private life. 
Interestingly, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy 
(U.S. Const.). To the extent that privacy is protected, the courts have established the 
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protections through case law derived mainly from the 1st, 3rd, 4th 5th, and 14th 
Constitutional Amendments. Privacy may be described as a somewhat flimsy and 
contextually malleable socially constructed quasi-right expectation of law. This is an 
important aspect of privacy because involuntary surveillance and the associated 
violations of a perceived privacy protection may affect individual behavior.  
In 2015, a University of Richmond Law Review article suggested that the mere 
expectation of community surveillance is enough to affect the behavioral outcomes of 
individuals (Kaminski, Margot, Witnov, & Shane, 2015). The paper provided a 
comprehensive review of First Amendment theory in the context of both the historical 
and modern decision making process. The authors highlighted potential censorship issues 
connected to the conforming effects inherent in community behavior and group social 
interactions (Kaminski, et al., 2015).  
The study suggested that community conformance has a direct impact on how 
policy is generated and how people decide social issues. Conformance fears may increase 
anxiety levels in individuals that are undecided on specific issues. It may even change 
closely held beliefs that are nonconforming resulting in cognitive dissonance within the 
individuals (Kaminski, et al., 2015). Researchers identified knowledge or awareness of 
privacy issues as a potential cause for changed perceptions and perceptions inside of a 




This chapter in my study describes privacy development over the past few 
decades as it has been interpreted by the courts in physical, personal, and digital forms. 
The march of technological progress has contributed to change by amplifying the 
inherent push-pull of privacy and public safety. That continued tension is demonstrated 
throughout the numerous privacy cases in the United States court system. The following 
analysis of privacy related case law demonstrates the uncertain nature of privacy related 
judicial outcomes and I discuss the categories that seem to frame the current legal review 
of privacy. 
Physical Privacy  
Courts have used the subjective expectation of privacy of individuals targeted by 
the government to define the limits of government intrusion (Smith v. Maryland, 1979); a 
case involving the State’s use of a pen register to secretly record a defendant’s phone call 
numbers. However, in Greenwood the court demarcated a limit to that expectation. The 
Greenwood case compares a defendant’s individual notion of privacy to society’s 
objective view of a legitimate expectation (California v. Greenwood, 1988). 
In Greenwood, the court found that garbage placed at the curb of a suspect’s 
residence does not meet the (narrower) societal expectation; effectively negating any 4th 
amendment claim from protecting the garbage bag’s contents. These criteria are 
embodied in the ‘Katz test’. In Katz, the defendant was recorded by the federal 
government while having ‘private’ conversations in a public telephone booth. The court 
determined that such conversations were, in fact, private and thereafter created a privacy 
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test consisting of two prongs. Under the test a defendant must demonstrate a subjective 
expectation of privacy and the objective public must be willing to recognize that 
expectation as legitimate (Katz., et al).  
Expectations of privacy depend heavily on an individual’s privacy sensitivity 
level. This level will temporarily rise (Farid, 2015), and specific civic behaviors can be 
artificially changed when people are made aware that their activities are being monitored 
(Panagopoulos, 2011). In response, some people choose to utilize anonymizing 
technologies to insulate themselves from monitoring (Madden & Rainie, 2015); or they 
may censor their actions entirely (Marthews & Tucker, 2014). 
However, other studies suggest that a larger segment of the public does not care 
about monitoring and that any level-increases diminish over time as people become 
immune to a heightened surveillance environment (Oulasvirta, 2012). According to the 
Pew Research Center, nearly half of U.S. citizens approve (or do not disapprove), of their 
government monitoring private communications (PRC, 2013). 
In 2015, an exploratory study of 30 cases were undertaken to determine whether 
short term privacy sensitivity levels could be manipulated in people exposed to video 
clips about privacy. The ‘treatment’ video clips were designed to inform the cases of the 
importance of privacy, surveillance, protecting personal information, and new technology 
(Farid, 2015). The control group was not exposed to the video clips about privacy and 
both groups responded to questionnaires’ regarding privacy. 
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The research demonstrated that neither group had an adequate understanding of 
privacy or surveillance related issues. It was only after the treatment group watched 
informative videos that their knowledge increased enough to understand the questions 
regarding RFID and other technology inquiries. Statistical analysis of the data obtained 
by Farid, 2015 revealed that exposure to the new information did significantly raise 
privacy expectation levels and personal privacy concerns (at least temporarily), and that 
women were disproportionately affected though the study did not offer a definitive reason 
why (Farid, 2015). While the study did evidence immediate changes in perceptions it did 
not comment specifically on whether those perceptions would result in changed behavior.  
A 2011 study by Panagopoulos went beyond individual perceptions and 
quantitatively examined large amounts of secondary data from an earlier 2008 analysis 
(demonstrating that community voter turnout could be artificially manipulated by 
informing community members that there voting activities were being monitored). The 
study found that people are ‘highly reactive’ to information suggesting their community 
would know whether they voted; and noted that the size of the community was not a 
significant predictor of the behavior change (Panagopoulos, 2011). 
The Panagopoulos study suggested that social pressure and the desire to exhibit 
community compliant social behavior occurs when people are confronted with concrete 
information that they’re behavior is not only monitored but reported and would be shared 
with other community members. The behavior change will occur from the mere ‘threat’ 
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of surveillance and exposure of non-conforming behaviors as the experiment offered no 
evidence that the people were actually being reported (Panagopoulos, 2011). 
Based on federal cases like the 1991 U.S. v. Penny-Feeney decision, one would 
suspect that the Supreme Court of the United States decision penned a decade later in the 
2001 Kyllo case would have protected the privacy of a defendant (against such things as 
the use of heat-sensing Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) by law enforcement). However, 
in Penny-Feeney, the district court upheld the use of FLIR by law enforcement (without a 
warrant), explaining that defendants did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy regarding the “heat waste” they created, nor did they attempt to exercise 
dominion over the waste preventing it from venting to the public.  
With the notable exception of Kyllo, the courts generally continue to view FLIR 
as a constitutionally acceptable method of warrantless surveillance by the government. 
Kyllo appears to have supported States rights’ instead of following the federally 
established history of cases. In 2001 Justice Scalia and the Kyllo majority opined that a 
FLIR device used by police to identify a hotter than usual house effectively explored the 
intimate details inside a private home; something normally requiring physical intrusion 
and therefore a warrant. Scalia wrote that, “to withdraw protection of this minimum 
expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment”. The minority noted that there should be a distinction between 




The Eleventh Circuit court in United States v. Ford attempted to remedy this 
seeming inconsistency by determining that, “the thermal imagery at issue here appears to 
be of such low resolution as to render it incapable of revealing the intimacy of detail and 
activity protected by the Fourth Amendment”, U.S. v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1994). FLIR 
technology has advanced since that opinion and is now very detailed.  
The court in both Myers and Pinson agreed that a FLIR device is passive and non-
intrusive. It does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of the home and that 
it operates by sampling the thermal waste given off by a structure without requiring 
beams or rays or any other penetration into the structure. This is very similar to the 
court’s interpretation of airspace above a residence. Airspace has been viewed by the 
courts as publicly assessable and not within the protections of the 4th amendment, thereby 
upholding law enforcement’s right to surveillance of properties from private aircraft 
without a warrant. It is like the ‘open field’ theory as outlined by Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57 (1924). Hester stands for the legal principle that an individual may not 
(legitimately) expect privacy outside the home except in areas immediately adjacent to 
the structure, even if they are on private property. 
Individual Privacy 
Privacy as an expansive protection extending beyond the 4th Amendment 
provisions of one’s home was expanded to include the actual individual. Over time, this 
idea has broadened to include aspects of the individual like reputation, intellectual 
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products, and spiritual nature. Privacy of the individual may be important because people 
may alter their behavior when they demonstrate concern over surveillance-risk levels. 
A study was undertaken to analyze a finite community of high-risk individuals 
following the events of September 11, 2001. The study was framed around the legal 
holding in the Heart of Atlanta Motel court case; one of the leading cases to address race 
issues and the exclusion of a specific race from accessing an otherwise public resource. 
This study was designed to parallel the experiences of the Sikhs in America following 
9/11; most of who refrained from air travel, and self-imposed travel restrictions to avoid 
embarrassment for some period. 
The study analyzed the post 9/11 Internet behavior of over three hundred (311) 
Muslim-Americans. Results suggested that among a minority of individuals who 
indicated that they believed their Internet use was being monitored only a very small 
percentage took actions to mitigate it (Sidhu, 2007). Some behavior change was 
observed, but not at a significant level. What explains this seemingly contradictory 
result? Could it be attributed to the surveillance source that was monitoring the 
community?  Could it be due to a six-year ‘acceptance’ period following 9/11? Is there a 
relationship between short term perception and long term behavioral changes linked to 
knowledge of surveillance? 
A study by Oulasvirta suggested that humans will adapt to long-term surveillance 
whether they want to or not. In 2012, 10 households participated in a 6 month 
longitudinal observation focused on analyzing the perceptions and behaviors of 
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individuals affirmatively opposed to monitoring (Oulasvirta, 2012). The study consisted 
of invasive in-home camera monitoring of the households and was based on a theory of 
Social Identity. That result suggested that an individual’s level of surveillance tolerance 
depends on the surveillance source – in favor of a shared identity (Oulasvirta, 2012). For 
example, people may be likely to share information (even very sensitive information), 
about their personal life on Facebook or Twitter because they have a shared identity with 
those ‘friends’ in the social community they are connected to. They may be far less likely 
to voluntarily share that same information with people outside that pre-selected friend 
community.  
The Oulasvirta study demonstrated that the anxiety levels of the participants 
decreased with time even though the surveillance level and invasive camera monitoring 
did not. The only departures from the result occurred when participants had to explain the 
cameras and monitoring equipment to household visitors or guests not aware of the study. 
This was attributed to the dissonance created in the minds of the study participants when 
visitors were not accepting or not understanding of the experiment (Oulasvirta, 2012). 
This again appears to confirm that community social acceptance plays a very important 
role in surveillance tolerance levels. 
While many of the characteristics of individual privacy perception and personal-
space expectation contain amorphous and flexible components, an individual’s DNA is 
arguably the most intimate and unchanging. Presumably, intrusions into this sacred 
domain would be the last to be relinquished through population acceptance. In June 2013 
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the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case, Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 133 S. Ct. 
1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). The court held that the defendant’s cheek swab was a minor 
(and brief), intrusion on privacy and that the warrantless collection of saliva DNA was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The majority equated obtaining a suspect’s 
DNA with other standard tasks of the post-arrest pre-conviction ‘booking’ procedure like 
photographing or fingerprinting a suspect.  
Conversely, the case of drawing blood from a suspect (specifically following a 
DWI), is quite the opposite. In McNeely the court determined that when an officer can 
reasonably obtain a warrant for blood draw they must do so, in keeping with the 4th 
amendment protections of an individuals’ right to be free from unreasonable searches 
(Missouri v. McNeely, 2014). It should be noted that live blood draws for the purpose of 
law enforcement are held in different regard than the retrieval of dried blood from under 
a suspect’s fingertips. The Supreme Court of the United States earlier held in Cupp v. 
Murphy that dried blood was essentially evanescent evidence and that a suspect could 
begin to remove it from his hands before police had a chance to obtain a warrant to 
preserve it (Cupp v. Murphy, 1973). The McNeely court found a blood draw to be an 
unreasonable search because there were no legitimate circumstances present that would 
constitute an exception to the requirement for a warrant, unlike Schmerber where there 




The privacy of an individual’s blood or DNA has been addressed by the courts for 
several decades. However, the legal system has only recently begun to address the 
complexity of issues involved in defining the extent of privacy with respect to one’s 
personal digital data. This may be due in large part to the relatively recent developments 
in technology and a lagging court response to emerging technological issues combined 
with the absence of traditional caselaw. Although courts may grapple with the application 
of new developments in technology every day, issues specific to privacy are particularly 
difficult to navigate due to the required balancing of personal interest in privacy with the 
State’s interest in security.  
The government’s ability to utilize personal data inferentially poses additional 
unique issues; most notably with error. An example from everyday life is easily 
imagined. An individual’s grocery shopping habits are often preserved in digital form 
through the ubiquitous use of membership and loyalty cards. These digital data records 
may demonstrate purchases of large quantities of fatty foods every week. 
Inferential analysis of the data could suggest that the purchaser is at a higher risk 
of health issues (high cholesterol, high blood pressure, or diabetes), and therefore could 
be subject to higher health insurance premiums; or at least continuous more invasive long 
term monitoring. What the individualized data points do not demonstrate is that while the 
shopper is buying the fatty foods the food is actually being fed to highly specialized sled 
dogs that require a high fat diet. This simple example demonstrates that a known 
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interrelationship among data points is required to avoid error and make accurate 
assessments. Merely having access to data is far more complex than it may initially 
appear and could result in very unfavorable consequences by government actors.  
It is this kind of potential for error that can occur when law enforcement seeks to 
access an individual’s cell phone data. As the Riley v. California (2014) court stated: 
“[c]ellphones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and 
communication among members of criminal enterprises that can provide valuable 
incriminating information about dangerous criminal – [p]rivacy comes at a cost”. The 
Riley court upheld (at least in part), individual privacy rights when it comes to data stored 
on a cell phone. The court indicated that while a search of the physical aspects of a 
cellphone are immune from the warrant requirement; the information stored in a cell 
phone generally does require a warrant to access.  
Law enforcement may not without a warrant search the data on a cell phone 
seized from an arrestee (excluding longstanding exceptions to warrantless searches under 
the 4th amendment like exigent circumstances). Supporting this rule a warrant can often 
be obtained digitally within minutes of law enforcement’s request using real-time 
interconnected technologies. Data on a cell phone can easily be preserved indefinitely by 
simply shutting the phone off or removing its battery. The exigent circumstances 
exception may be used to negate the rule where circumstances reasonably require it. This 
relatively new ‘cellphone rule’ contrasts the usual probable cause searches that have been 
found to be reasonable when incident to a lawful arrest (Chimel v. California, 1969). 
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Digital data in its hard form (on the computer or hardware storage device), can be 
also be searched by the government under several warrantless conditions including the 
usual plain view, consent, and exigent circumstance exceptions. Border crossings and the 
border crossing exception (see 19 C.F.R. 162.6; authorizing warrantless searches of 
electronic devices at the border), offer yet another loophole in the requirement for a 
warrant to obtain a person’s electronic data; this with potential ‘soft data’ implications.  
The border exception began with the diminishment of an individual’s expectation 
of privacy in an automobile. Courts have consistently held that drivers may be stopped at 
border crossings into the U.S. and their vehicle contents searched without a warrant or 
probable cause (Terry v. Ohio, 1968). Border searches may be made in the absence of 
any individualized suspicion at border checkpoints within reasonably geographical 
boundaries (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 1976), (Carroll v. United States, 1925). It 
is now well established that border authorities may search computers and digital storage 
devices without the usual need for a warrant or even probably cause; this is a blanket 
exception that includes all international airports.  
Access to and utilization of an individual’s personal digital data regardless of its 
mechanism of acquisition can lead to substantial inferential errors. While access to 
multiple points of data can serve to mitigate this compartmentalization issue, aggregating 




The courts have consistently upheld the notion that relatively minor augmentation 
of standard policing does not change the nature of the acquired information which itself 
may or may not be protected by privacy provisions. One persuasive line of cases in 
support of personal privacy derives from the court’s mosaic theory.  
The mosaic reasoning was exercised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. 
v. Jones, (2012). The that while individuals relinquish their expectation of privacy by 
disclosing information publicly (under the Third-Party Doctrine and Public Disclosure 
Doctrines), that information cannot be used ‘in the aggregate’ by law enforcement 
because it has the potential to disclose far more personal information than the target 
would otherwise reasonably believe (Rosenzweig, 2017).  
The theory was specifically applicable in a case where a law enforcement target’s 
car was tracked over the course of several months. While the travel route of the car was 
public and therefore immune from 4th amendment protection, the travel routes of the car 
over the course of multiple months was not. It is not reasonable that the travel routes of a 
person over such a long course of time would be considered available to the public unless 
the person was being targeted (U.S. v. Jones, 2012). The 4th amendment argument 
regarding Mosaic theory may also be seen in the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States, 
(2018). The court indicated that individuals have an expectation of privacy in the 
government tracking their movements over a period of time. In that case Carpenter 
argued that cell phone signal data required a warrant and not merely a court order to 
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access. The majority court based its reasoning on a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
while a dissenting opinion believed the 4th amendment argument was better supported by 
a protection of personal property or location data (Carpenter v. U.S., 2018).  
In either instance, an aggregate of information could tell law enforcement much 
more about a target than a public location alone, developing into evidence of personal, 
‘intimate’ actions or associations that could be protected by the 4th amendment. One of 
the notable problems for the mosaic theory is the indefinable nature from which the idea 
derives. That is, what is a reasonable amount of surveillance or how much surveillance is 
required before it jumps the hurdle of improper aggregation. In Carpenter, it was argued 
that 24 hours was the line that should not be crossed (Carpenter v. United States, 2018), 
but the question was left undefined may allow courts to make individual assessments and 
case outcomes become unpredictable.  
The government has utilized Mosaic theory referencing national security concerns 
in defense of non-transparency and the refusal to release otherwise non-sensitive 
information (Pozen, 2005). The label of Mosaic as applied by the Court and government 
was later developed into a working theory by Pozen and is now widely accepted and used 
to describe a variety of situations where aggregated data may be formed into something 
greater than the individual data (Pozen, 2005).  
One question arising from this scenario (in the context of digital data), is directly 
related to application of the Third-Party Rule. During normal daily activities data is 
knowingly relinquished from computers to third-party traffic handling systems, mass data 
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storage units, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This is the case for all Internet users 
including those who utilize email, social networking, or even so-called private websites. 
Like short car trips, limited social network data may reveal only a small amount 
of public information; but large amounts of data (like car trips added up over the course 
of several months), can reveal very private or intimate information about an individual 
such that an entire character profile may be developed. Theories of aggregation of mass 
surveillance data like Mosaic leave open questions regarding levels of intimacy, 
relationship characteristics, and how what levels of privacy protection they should be 
afforded in email, Internet searches, or social media connections.  
The potential issues associated with third party aggregation of surveillance data 
are easily understood. Suppose Mary, an individual on the phone with her friend Bob 
(who is on holiday in a country with limited Internet access), uses a search engine to look 
up information on a particularly unpleasant sexually transmitted disease. This is done so 
that relevant medical information could be relayed to Bob who is working abroad and 
does not have adequate Internet access to do the research himself. Mary’s research 
(captured and stored by the search engine), may later be combined with a digital receipt 
for antibiotics (purchased by her daughter at the local pharmacy using her mom’s 
discount card), may lead an analyst to the misguided conclusion that Mary has a sexually 
transmitted disease. In fact, she did not. Although multiple data points and references 
were used in the assessment, the inference was not aligned in context and would not yield 
an accurate assessment because the data were not in context. 
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These examples begin to shed light on why defining privacy limitations and 
protections is so important. Many law-abiding citizens may be tempted to advocate for a 
version of privacy best described as ‘when one has nothing to hide, one requires only a 
minimum level of privacy’. If privacy is required at all it can exist where it is not 
requiring complete segmentation from the government.  
However, the more informed scholar may see that privacy is not necessarily a veil 
behind which evil must per se be taking place. Rather, it is better described as a 
protective barrier that exists between an individual and their government. It is necessary 
to prevent tyranny, mistake, poor decision-making or policy implementation based on 
inaccurate or incomplete data obtained from invaded portions of one’s life (Solove, 
2018).  
Surveillance 
Historically, no discussion of surveillance and privacy would be complete without 
discussion of Bentham’s theoretical Panopticon (Semple, 1993). The Panopticon may be 
described as an architectural design that envisioned a penal building designed to facilitate 
persistent monitoring of inmates. It utilized a tall central structure surrounded by multiple 
levels of pie-shaped circular cells, each with a window at their outermost side. The 
window would illuminate the cells with outside light but the center viewing structure 
would remain dark. The monitoring agent would be able to view all the inmates, but the 
inmates would not be able to see the monitor.  
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The effect produced inmates who would not know when they were being watched 
but that they could be watched at any or all times. In theory, the result of this structure 
may be a (prison) population that will alter their behavior always in conformance with 
prison regulations to avoid punishment because there is no way for an inmate to predict 
when they are being monitored. The assumptions supporting panopticon monitoring may 
parallel the unseen mass surveillance programs used by the government. The government 
could watch the population but the population is unable to see it watching.  
I was unable to identify research analyzing the impact of one way mass 
surveillance programs on society in the context of privacy. This may have been due in 
part to the relatively recent introduction of social media as a tool of mass surveillance for 
large populations or it may be attributed to the relative lack of conscious awareness of 
surveillance programs by the public prior to 2013. My research offered some insight into 
these programs and the associated public policies impacts they may have on society.  
Personal privacy may mean the protection of individual data or metadata so that 
they do not become susceptible to abuse, misuse, or contextual misunderstanding. One 
primary area of privacy concern that my research identified was the proliferation of 
government surveillance powers as counterpoise to an individuals’ right to be let alone 
and be free from excessive government interference (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). 
However, the ability of the government to monitor and track elements of its population is 
central to civil administration and governance. Monahan commented that an 
40 
 
understanding of surveillance is a required function to, [order] society through the 
regulation of individual or group behavior (Jing, 2016).  
Government surveillance of citizens is to some degree not defined only by the 
monitoring of criminal activity or preventing nefarious activities (although one would be 
hard pressed to argue that some level of surveillance is required to prevent complex 
criminal enterprises from overtaking society). Nor is government surveillance necessarily 
as ominous or Orwellian as some have depicted it (see Orwell, 1949). Governments have 
a legitimate interest in even the most democratic of constructs, in monitoring their 
citizens for public health disease outbreaks, social order disruptions, infrastructure needs, 
education compliance, and many other nontotalitarian oversight requirements. Society 
has an interest in allowing legitimate government surveillance for the same reasons.  
Society to a large degree may coexist within an intrusive government surveillance 
environment due in part to a phenomenon called acceptance. Bauman’s 2014 study 
explained the phenomenon of acceptance in two ways (Bauman, 2014). The 2013 
discovery of the government’s bulk data collection activities may have surprised the 
public. However, with the passage of time a phenomenon called ‘familiarization’ occurs. 
When individuals are exposed to a shocking event, they will over time, become less 
shocked and increasingly desensitized to it. The pervasive and ubiquitous nature of 
surveillance has over time desensitized U.S. society (Bauman, 2014).  
Second, individuals in a Web 2.0+ environment of interactivity experience daily 
social surveillance or peer to peer lateral surveillance between community members. The 
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idea of monitoring friends and family throughout the day through Facebook or a Twitter 
feed may be framed as fun and engaging (Bauman et al., 2014). Over time the idea of 
surveillance as a fun activity overrides the discussion and detracts from the more formal 
characteristics of surveillance. People may come to expect to be monitored by their social 
communities and even craft their personal appearance accordingly.  
Mass Monitoring Programs 
Following the June 2013 release of top-secret documents by former NSA 
contractor and whistle blower Edward Snowden the United States public became aware 
that their government was spying on them and acquiring vast quantities of personal data 
through covert monitoring programs. These programs utilized third-party data collection 
techniques to obtain private information on virtually everyone in the United States. The 
programs were based on the use of secret agreements between government spy agencies 
and private companies, corporate proxies, search engines, as well as Web 2.0 social 
media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Skype (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
2020). 
Much of the literature commenting on the event and that comments on these 
programs include references to the, “privacy – security” spectrum; aka the tension 
inherent between civil liberties, individual security, and the scope of power required by 
the government to achieve a specific level of safety. The privacy – security spectrum may 
be described as a spread or range of amplitudes that define quantities of both ideas. There 
is no reasonable way to approach privacy as a binary issue wherein there is not a middle 
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ground. The spectrum represents on one side the private individual and on the opposing 
side the governmental interest in national security that is supposed to require monitoring 
and oversight.  
The field occupying the spread of space between the two end-points represents 
either an increase or decrease of civil protections afforded to individuals. It is important 
to note that the spectrum does not represent an actual level of safety afforded the 
individual; that relationship would be illustrated by a “privacy – safety” spectrum and 
that field is different. That would measure the subjective safety of an individual against 
the increasing or decreasing civil protections afforded that individual. Neither of these 
spectrums demonstrates a quantifiable objective measure of security, but simply 
illuminates a relative level of safety when compared against a loss of civil liberties.  
To many outside the counterterrorism contingent a policy issue post-September 
11, 2001 may be striking a balance between security and privacy. Previous studies 
suggest a correlation between perceived increases in (personal) threats and the 
willingness of individuals to relinquish privacy or civil liberties (Davis & Silver, 2004). 
Whether there is a relationship between the variables or where they intercept(s) on a 
graphed-curve of security, safety, and privacy may require additional analysis and may 
not be a foregone assumption. Increased surveillance (decreased privacy), and a safer 
society may not be a known, definable, or accepted relationship. If such a relationship 




Perhaps the most prolific examples commenting on the privacy security spectrum 
in existing literature are related to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, (USA 
PATRIOT ACT, 2001), and its progeny. Following the terrorist attacks on the United 
State occurring on 9/11/2001, the Act was officially enacted to protect the American 
public from further terrorist activities (USA PATRIOT ACT, 2001). However, it soon 
became clear to outside observers that the legislation was operationally designed to 
circumvent established legal protections by allowing domestic spying of citizens using 
police powers not intended by the drafters of the United States Constitution by 
eliminating checks and balances previously reserved for the judicial branch (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 2020).   
The PATRIOT ACT was pass in record time and was a powerful expansion of 
prior existing legislation allowing the National Security Agency (NSA), to intercept 
suspect communication but also allowed the agency to listen in on unrelated parties 
connected with that communication (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). Among 
several problematic sections of the Act was Section 203. The section provided law 
enforcement with among other things, broad abilities to intercept massive amounts of 
electronic communication and data greatly enhancing the government’s ability to share 
information both inter-agency and extra-agency through the expanded use of intelligence 
Fusion Centers.  
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Several follow-up or related legislative actions broadened the Act’s powers 
causing public interest and civil rights advocacy groups to voice concern regarding the 
expansive nature of the new laws. These included Total Information Awareness Program 
(TIA), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), 
expansion of pre-existing ECPA and FISA, the National Security Letter (NSL) laws, and 
others (NSL, n.d.). In its wake, Washington created dozens of new intelligence groups, 
agencies and sub-agencies including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI, n.d.).  
As time passed in the post 9/11 environment, enhanced ‘security’ at the expense 
of civil liberties progressed beyond electronic intercepts and began to include invasive 
body scans at airports and other physical intrusions. It wasn’t until Edward Snowden 
leaked classified information that the U.S. public became aware of the actual nature and 
extent of the domestic surveillance that the government was undertaking. Snowden 
disclosed information on the government’s mass population data collection programs (not 
unlike the less technically sophisticated COINTELPRO of the 1970s), and data mining 
programs Xkeyscore, Quantuminsert, Bullrun, Dishfire, and one codenamed PRISM. The 
PRISM program allowed government agents to retain and sort vast amounts of citizen-
data by contracting with telecommunications and Internet Service Providers. 
Snowden also disclosed information about the top-secret government program 
codenamed UPSTREAM. This program along with Quantuminsert, tapped into 
transatlantic sub-sea fiber cables to intercept virtually all incoming and outgoing Internet 
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communications. The program was authorized under Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); all without a warrant or informing individuals they 
were being monitored.  
In 2014 a quantitative study looked at whether the Snowden event triggered 
changes in Internet use. Using Internet search data derived from hundreds of common 
keywords compiled from the Google search engine the study examined whether people 
modified their Internet search keyword behavior immediately following Edward 
Snowden’s 2013 release of top-secret information regarding domestic government 
surveillance. The study design utilized keyword assignments to one of three (3) 
categories ranging from ‘less private’ to ‘more private’ or ‘sensitive’. The keywords 
ranged from personal disease inquiries to questions about the CIA or other overtly 
sensitive government issues (Marthews & Tucker, 2017). 
The study found that search word usage following the 2013 Snowden event 
(assigned to the high-sensitivity category), fell by ten (10) percent (Marthews et al., 
2017). This means that for every ten (10) searches done prior to the Snowden event only 
nine (9) were done after it. While not a large change per se the study found that the 
change was statistically significant. The study authors suggested that the result had the 
potential to influence international commerce as people may stop using U.S. search 
engines do to fear of loss of privacy (Marthews, et al., 2017).  
This paper reviewed information obtained from legal cases, academic journals, 
research and dissertation database papers, peer reviewed social science articles, and 
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public information sources published in years 2011 through 2016. A few resources 
outside the traditional five-year publication window will also be included to present 
relevant information in an accurate historical context. 
The Walden University library research databases ProQuest and EBSCOhost will 
be used to access many of these sources. Electronic search terms entered in to those 
databases include privacy, privacy defined, elite theory, classical elite theory, 9/11, post-
9/11, USA PATRIOT ACT, Snowden, privacy perceptions, government monitoring, 
Total Information Awareness (TIA), The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
and big brother. While additional sources are analyzed to ensure a broad understanding of 
the subject matter, many will be intentionally excluded because they are deemed to be 
redundant, outside the scope of the study, or non-conforming to the inclusion protocol. 
Ultimately, the literature review will provide the reader with a solid foundation from 
which to understand the research material and overarching theory presented in the study. 
Summary 
My research suggested that many Americans consider privacy and security to be 
an important aspect of their personal life. Those views may translate into emotional and 
sometimes negative reactions when new social policy affecting their privacy is proposed. 
However, a review of literature and an analysis of the emergent themes discussing these 
phenomena revealed that many individuals may not understand what privacy is or how 
privacy doctrines apply in everyday life.  
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My review of available literature did not find information addressing the potential 
application of elite theory to national security and privacy policy. This highlighted an 
area of study that may not be readily available to policy creators who are trying to avoid 
unwanted collateral policy outcomes like social disruption or noncompliance.  
The elite theory social construct may prove to be significant to the understanding 
of how society will respond to a given change in public policy. By using secondary data 
and thematic analysis techniques my study inquired whether elite theory could be utilized 
by policy professionals to suggest social outcomes prior to policy implementation. The 
implications for policy professional are potentially far reaching and may apply to social 
change across a broad spectrum of individuals. Policy modeling tools may be used to 
shape policy without the requirement of social discourse and could potentially be used to 
bypass the normative democratic structure of decision making.  
This study evaluated the different types of privacy, described how privacy is 
defined in America, and analyzed the relationships required to maintain an effective 
partition of privacy between the state and the population. I then identified the threshold 
associated with overcoming that partition and identified the point at which individuals 
will shape their behavior around changes in privacy perceptions.  
This research may have applicability to national security policy involving privacy, 
population monitoring, or data gathering. It may also extend into collateral areas of social 
policy like the use of advanced interrogation techniques or offsite detention facilities. The 
result of the research may be relevant to the drafting and implementation of nearly all 
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future domestic security policies and could offer policy professionals more freedom as 
they endeavor to balance the needs of the government against the responsibilities of an 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
In this chapter I discussed the methodological approach used to address a missing 
area of literature pertaining to the use of elite theory in security and privacy policy 
analysis and addressed whether elite theory may be used as an analytical component 
when drafting national security policy. The research examined the potential relationship 
between the United States government’s domestic eavesdropping programs and the 
public interest of protecting individual privacy.  
The purpose of the study was to test the hypothesis that elite theory can be applied 
in an assessment of how a population will behave in response to privacy intrusions by the 
government. The theory suggests that a nonelite population is generally apathetic to 
security policy and is largely devoid of sustained investment in the protection of 
individual privacy rights (Pareto, 1935). This research was undertaken to assist national 
level policy makers, analysts, and academics in their understanding of elite theory as a 
tool of modern policy development.  
To be effective, the post-9/11 national security posture of the United States 
required increasing quantities of highly detailed intelligence obtained at the cost of 
individual privacy (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). As such, it may be reasoned 
that national security policy accounted for the social impact created from the acquisition 
of that intelligence. If elite theory can suggest behavior than policy creators may be free 




This chapter addressed the primary research question, methodology rationale, 
theoretical approach, threats to validity, ethical considerations, and overall study design. I 
discussed secondary data analysis of the relationship between privacy (in a pre-Snowden 
environment), and variations present in a post-Snowden enhanced monitoring 
environment. The acquisition and use of secondary data as well as statistical research 
tools utilized in the analysis were also explained. Finally, the possible dissemination and 
future use of the resultant research was addressed.  
Research Questions and Design 
This study was designed to examine the relationship between domestic 
government surveillance programs (an independent variable) and changes in individual 
privacy behavior (a dependent variable). I investigated whether elite theory may be used 
as a tool to assist with policy decision making. My review other research studies 
established this nonexperimental correlational analysis using archival data. The study is 
informed by thematic analysis of carefully selected topical sources. The research question 
and testable hypothesis are as follows:  
RQ1: Using prior studies and secondary data; what is the nature of the 
relationship among the independent variable (domestic government spying), and the 
dependent variable (individual privacy behavior)? 
H01: There is a relationship between the independent variable (domestic 
government spying), and the dependent variable (individual privacy behavior). 
Domestic government surveillance will affect individual behavior. 
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Ha1: There is no relationship between the independent variable (domestic 
government spying), and the dependent variable (individual privacy behavior). 
Domestic government surveillance will not affect individual behavior in a 
significant manner. 
Using a thematic analysis of existing research offers a unique perspective of 
aggregated data not available to the original individual researcher (Braun & Clark, 2008). 
Thematic analysis offers broad access to a wide variety of data that would not otherwise 
be obtainable considering financial and logistical constraints, while at the same time 
offering a more concise evaluation of the research question (Braun & Clark, 2008). This 
study was undertaken to analyze prior study outcomes and identify previously 
undiscovered relationships. The thematic analysis of multiple existing study results is 
used to inform my analysis of secondary data from pre-existing archived data sets. The 
data will provide increased assessment capabilities and offer significant advantages over 
single-slice data acquisition techniques. 
Methodology 
While both the thematic and secondary data analysis techniques selected for this 
research offer advantages there are several challenges that were addressed. First, because 
there was a degree of freedom to choose data that was used in the secondary study, I was 
aware of the potential of introducing selection bias. I took care in not purposefully 
selecting data that supported the hypothesis. Second, I was aware that the data obtained 
from secondary sources could have come prepackaged with interpretations of that data 
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and those could have been transferred to my study so I was careful to avoid that. Third, 
the internal validity of the secondary data relied on an outside source (Pew’s research 
methods and safeguards), and not one specifically designed by me. I independently 
analyzed and verified that their research design met the same criteria I would have used 
to acquire the secondary data as my own primary data and was satisfied that it did. Even 
with these challenges (common to both the secondary data analysis and thematic analysis 
methods), the analysis tools I used provided a solid methodology for discovering new 
patterns and relationships. Each of the challenges were mitigated with solid research 
technique combined with careful attention to detail and the awareness of and elimination 
of potential bias.  
A comprehensive synthesis of the secondary data with results obtained from the 
thematic analysis provided a robust understanding of population sentiment relating to 
domestic government surveillance and individual privacy. The research offers insight into 
the viability of elite theory as a predictive tool in the context of national security policy 
creation.  
Modern social science offers two primary methodological research design 
approaches: quantitative and qualitative. Both offer advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the type of data used, data characteristics, and the research outcome that is 
preferred. Both methods are useful to explain phenomena but approach the explanation 
from different perspectives.  
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Qualitative analysis uses an inductive methodology to explain an observable 
behavior or condition through a subjective lens (Suter, 2012). Data acquisition is largely 
exploratory and may be obtained several different ways including through the descriptive 
life experiences of subjects (Suter, 2012). The goal of qualitative research design is to 
record and explain lived experiences (from which inferences may later be drawn about 
larger populations), and to explore and understand how phenomena unfold (Suter, 2012). 
Data is not number based and can include narratives, pictures, objects, or observations. 
This qualitative approach offers significant flexibility allowing it to change as the study 
progresses (Suter, 2012). A qualitative design is best suited for use in the investigatory 
phase of understanding new a phenomenon or for understanding the deeper social 
meaning behind an event (Suter, 2012).  
Quantitative analysis is an objective, structured methodology that allows a 
researcher to numerically analyze statistically significant attributes obtained from a 
representative sample of the population (Creswell, 2003). The deductive design of a 
quantitative methodology affords high external validity, is objective, deductive, and relies 
on an experiment-based framework to validate a theory or confirm a hypothesis 
(Creswell, 2003). Quantitative analysis uses structured data to examine any correlational 
relationship between two variables (Mertler, 2018). Because results are replicable and 
there is an inherent cause and effect involved in this type of analysis, the result may often 
be used to support predictions (Mertler, 2018).  
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One characteristic of a quantitative study is the high level of external validity 
(Creswell, 2003). This refers to the ability of the study to be later generalized to a larger 
population. In quantitative research, external validity is high because the design 
inherently eliminates outside variables and external factors (Flick, 2017). For example, in 
my study the data are preexisting and will remain accessible to other researchers who 
may replicate the experiment in the future while still obtaining the same result.  
 A quantitative approach was best for this study because it solidly aligns with both 
the research question and hypothesis test. The structured data can be easily understood 
through numerical analysis and the results applied to a large population. Study data was 
analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software Version 
23, and the analysis will be informed by the results of the metadata.  
Data Selection 
Data was obtained from applicable English-only key word and phrase searches 
included in years 2011 through 2016. The searches were conducted using the Walden 
University Dissertation Database, Walden University online library, ProQuest research 
databases, Pew research databases, and Google Scholar. Search inquiries offered several 
thousand results; a small percentage of which are in alignment with the study. These were 
meticulously synthesized and compared against pre-established inclusion criteria. The 
selected scholarly works strongly aligned with the study goals. This reflects the effort to 
include content-appropriate articles in the analysis.  
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Following an evaluation of potential nationwide data sources, the data sets in this 
study derived from the Pew Research databases. Pew is a nonprofit, nonpartisan and non-
advocacy facts tank that values objectivity, accuracy, and rigor; and is committed to 
impartial research and data (Pew, 2020). The foundation conducts public opinion polling, 
demographic research, content analysis and other data-driven social science research. 
Pew’s mission is to inform the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping 
America and the world (Pew, 2020). Table 1 shows the databases and information that 
were selected from ninety possible sets that are available from Pew: 
Table 1       
Data Analysis—PEW Datasets 
 
Date Range Database N 
    
2006 12/01 – 12/30 Digital Footprints 3379 
    2013 5-Jun Snowden Leak x 
    2013 07/01 – 07/30 Anonymity 1002 
2013 08/07 – 09/16 Connectivity 1801 
    2014 01/10 – 01/27 Privacy Panel (1) 607 
2014 08/05 – 09/02 Privacy Panel (2) 498 
2014-2015 11/26 – 01/03 Privacy Panel (3) 475 
2015 01/27 – 02/16 Privacy Panel (4) 461 
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Pew’s Social and Demographic database as well as its Internet, Science, and 
Technology database content provided a high level of applicability to my research 
question. Using more than one data set may increase the number of available data points 
within a specified frame of time that contrasts with the single-slice data capture 
technique. While both single-slice and multiset options have merit depending on the 
specific application that a researcher desires; the latter may offer more robust capture 
opportunities for this study. It also may account for sentiment change over time, mitigate 
potential bias created from news of current events, and provide a larger statistical pool 
from which to draw inferences and it is for these reasons that I selected this method for 
the study. 
Each data set was individually analyzed using key word, key phrase, and subject 
matter matching, ensuring that the content parallels the framework of the study. Content 
matches included technological connectivity, surveillance issues, social media use, 
mainstream media awareness, personal anonymity, communication behavior, social 
interactives, and community involvement. 
While the diversity of the Pew research data provided a solid survey of national 
privacy perceptions, there were limitations. Sampling errors (the difference between the 
value derived from the population sample and the actual value associated with the entire 
population), can occur in any of the data sets (Dodge, 2005). Similarly, survey bias can 
occur when there is a difference between the surveyed population (sample), and the 
whole population (Stat Trek, 2020). Subpopulations within the sample can be overlooked, 
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excluded, or their characteristics not properly accounted for (Stat Trek, 2020). For 
example, the inclusion of survey answers from a retired law enforcement officer may 
skew the data obtained; the officer is a member of a subpopulation exhibiting attributes or 
weight that may not have been properly accounted for (when compared with the 
population).  
While the Pew research data in this study already existed, it was not immune from 
self-reporting limitations. Respondents may have unintentionally report false answers, 
exaggerated, or even lied. Additionally, the collection methods used required respondents 
to provide responses using a limited number of feedback options. These may not have 
adequately reflect more complex scenarios thus yielding responses of limited usefulness. 
Data for the study was originally obtained between the year 2013 and 2016. Data 
obtained before 2013 was generally be excluded from the study because of a limited need 
for information prior to the Snowden surveillance data dump.  
Data Analysis 
Analysis was accomplished by assigning government surveillance monitoring 
programs as an independent variable and an individual’s privacy behavior as a dependent 
variable in the observational model. The model was designed to identify any relationship 
between the variables and to examine descriptive and thematic patterns if they existed.  
Thematic Analysis 
A thematic analysis, the examination and synthesis of aggregated information 
obtained from more than one previously completed study from which themes emerge, are 
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identified and extracted (Flick, 2017), was chosen to provide a more robust and accurate 
result than a single study analysis may have. I applied the thematic analysis inclusion 
criteria across multiple topical research papers to inform the correlational study of the 
Pew research data in this study.  
The emergence of thematic inclusion criteria for the research identified in the 
literature review section of Chapter 2 included determinations of relevancy of the 
research inquiry, relevancy of the data, publication date, and peer review status. Studies 
were selected for inclusion in the analysis if they addressed the issue(s) of right to 
privacy, government monitoring, changes in privacy behavior, or individual privacy 
perceptions, and would contribute to an overall understanding of the research problem. 
These suggested a strong relationship between an individual’s perception of a 
terrorism threat and a level of acquiesces to the loss of specific civil liberties. They also 
suggested that both perceptual and behavioral alterations were observed in protective 
behavior after the Snowden information dump. The behavior data provided useful 
information but relied on self-reporting. Results may have been generated by sample 
populations that were potentially influenced by skewing factors like priming bias, 
suggestion bias, or the Hawthorne effect. This is not necessarily a reflection of deficient 
study methodology as some limitations are an inherent function of data collection 
surveys; nonetheless they may fail to provide an ideal tool for policy analysis.  
This study was designed to mitigate the limitations associated with single-slice 
survey timing and survey bias by reporting outcome effect using qualitative descriptors. 
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The improvement relies on thematic analysis; a widely accepted method of social science 
inquiry that when implemented properly exhibits a high degree of confidence and error 
avoidance (Flick, 1998). It is a research tool that allows one to aggregate research results 
and compare results across multiple studies having similar but not identical 
characteristics (Braun & Clarke, 2008). A multiple study thematic analysis was selected 
because it may identify differences and similarities between research outcomes 
highlighting values not evident in any one single study. 
 Unlike the t or F statistical tests, this method does not rely upon sample size to 
describe significance. Rather, it utilizes a methodology to compare the meaningful 
aspects of data of different studies to determine significance. Thematic analysis is 
important not only for its ability to compare effects across multiple studies, but also for 
its ability to combine experimental results from studies with different population sizes 
(Braun & Clarke, 2012). Even relatively small studies can become more useful when 
their result is combined with and compared to results from larger studies. Synthesis 
increases the analytical usefulness of otherwise accurate and descriptive yet less 
impactful studies (Braun & Clarke, 2012).  
Comparing the outcomes of different studies incorporating different population 
sizes or variable characteristics can present a challenge. While a Null Hypothesis 
Significance Test result may provide a way to classify a null hypothesis as either ‘likely’ 
or ‘unlikely’ to occur in the population based upon a defined confidence criterion it does 
little to increase knowledge about the magnitude or objective importance of the observed 
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effect. The issue is evident where there is a statistically significant but small effect size 
that has a high level of real-life importance, or a large effect size having a lower real-life 
importance. Effect size may be subjective and somewhat arbitrary unless the context 
from which it is being reported is understood. Effect size is derived from a study’s 
sample size, variability, and outcome (Boslaugh, 2012). Instead of inquiring simply 
whether an observed result is a function of population or represents a significant effect, 
effect size analysis inquiries into the magnitude of an observed effect.  
Standard significance testing methods indicate the likelihood that an observed 
result is due to population variances or sampling anomalies. The accuracy of a result 
subjected to Null Hypothesis Significance Testing is based upon probability inference 
and relies on population sample size. For example, a sample of five-million data points 
may yield a ‘significant’ result because when compared against the null (0) a fractionally 
small mean difference can appear statistically important; while the same mean difference 
in a one-hundred-point data sample would not be labeled as significant. 
The method selected for this study incorporates an aggregation of statistical 
inferences to describe cross-study outcomes irrespective of individual statistical 
significance. It incorporates effect size as an objective standardized measure of the 
importance of an observed effect (Field, 2005), to compare the magnitude of variation in 




Secondary Data Analysis 
Secondary data was analyzed to identify relationships between the variables 
changes in privacy behavior and domestic government surveillance programs. The 
analysis was designed to safeguard against the influence of bias, internal, and external 
variables, selected data sets were aggregated, and responses that are not applicable to the 
study or that are unable to be normalized were redacted.  
Inclusion of archival data was accomplished by using a selection protocol 
designed to ensure homogeneous data across sets to mitigate potential selection bias. The 
protocol required that the data selected parallel the nature of this study’s variables as 
closely as possible. The data was place and time appropriate and derived from the 
national population (individuals residing in the United States and who have access to 
media). The Pew research data selected for the study is content appropriate, topically 
consistent, single-sourced, secondary data providing a substantial volume of data points, 
variety of demographic, and continuity over years that would not otherwise be available 
in a primary study that is limited by financial and logistical constraints. 
The Pew research data included 3,379 data points from year 2006 (prior to the 
Snowden leak occurring June 5, 2013), 2,803 data points from 2013, 1,580 data points 
from 2014 (noting a three day overlap into 2015), and 461 from 2015; totaling 8,223 
available data points. The data offers valuable insight into individual privacy expectations 
through a multi-year window and suggesting how the United States population responded 
to the disclosure of government surveillance programs. The study merges the results of 
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the secondary data analysis with the information from the thematic analysis. This resulted 
in a synthesis of data patterns and inferential conclusions about the population response 
to domestic government surveillance.  
While each the Pew data sets were wholly applicable to the question(s) addressed 
in the study there was a significant degree of variation in both the semantic structure and 
phraseology. This highlights the importance of the coding structure that was developed 
for the study.  
Coding 
The analysis required a degree of reliable data uniformity to operate properly. To 
achieve this the study relied on coding techniques to translate non-linear variables 
obtained from multiple datasets into a usable format that could be statistically analyzed. 
The outcome of each dataset was coded in accordance with the coding scheme described 
herein and a resultant quantitative effect was captured and reported. Coding the data 
obtained from the Pew research datasets was undertaken by assigning categorical values 
to each participant response.  
Once the data were coded by the software it was used to generate an analytical 
result. This informed the study about relationships between mass monitoring and a 
population response to it. Multiple independent variable logistical regression outputs 
were correlated and examined to identify statistically significant associations. Logistical 
regression was chosen as a predictive analysis model for its ability to analyze 
independent variables and provide a statistical outcome using a categorical dependent 
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variable. The research was analyzed via the coded outcome of questions posed to 
participants regarding their thoughts and behavior while being surveilled or monitored by 
the government. The result informed the research as to whether intrusive surveillance 
programs influence individual behavior. Results are noted in Chapter 4 of the study.   
Trustworthiness 
Some studies require the use of an external committee evaluation or a pilot study 
to test the validity of the study instrument prior to actual implementation. However, 
because this study utilized secondary data and thematic analysis a pilot study was not 
required.  
Both external and internal validity was paramount to ensuring a reliable study 
outcome. A lower level of validity may have affected the accuracy of the study’s 
inferences or conclusions. The quantitative orientation of the study lends itself to a higher 
level of external validity beyond the existing study as it may support the work of a future 
researcher attempting a similar type of study in a different place and time.  
This study was undertaken to understand the privacy behavior of a national 
population notwithstanding potentially significant changes in the security environment. 
The sample population was inferred from the national population and is not 
geographically or demographically restrictive (except the English language requirement). 
The study results reflected population sentiment and behavior regarding personal privacy 
over a period of years.  
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The data in the secondary data analysis was obtained from the Pew research data 
sets described above. Data points were obtained from a randomized test population using 
two combined probability sampling methods, random digit dialing (RDD), and address-
based sampling (ABS) (Pew, 2020). Both the RDD and ABS methods may offer 
independent advantages and disadvantages. Utilizing both methods in combination with 
one another may provide increased sampling accuracy. RDD telephone surveys have 
historically been the gold standard of obtaining data using surveys (Yeager, et al., 2009).  
However, some sample populations may present difficulties if they include 
individuals who do not use a landline phone, who implement call screening, or who 
present with a high degree of privacy. The ABS solution offers an economical, less 
intrusive sampling method that includes the ability to access non-landline households 
(Yeager, et al., 2009). Utilization of both methods in this study may help with mitigation 
of potentially missing or misleading data from a diverse sample population.  
Internal validity describes the reliability between the dependent and independent 
variables (Bhandari, 2020). It underlines the statistical analysis methodology and assists 
the reader in understanding the nature of the measures of association (Bhandari, 2020). 
Standard internal validity threats like experimental mortality, instrumentation, and 
maturation were not applicable here because the data is archival and the analysis is a 
thematic analysis.  
Internal validity was accomplished by implementing cross tabulation analysis 
using the independent variable to identify a correlation with the dependent variable. A 
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correlative relationship was identified where a change of behavior within the sample 
population (the dependent variable), corresponded with the public learning that their 
communications are being monitored by the government, (the independent variable). The 
statistical analysis was undertaken using SPSS software Version 23.  
The reliability characteristic of a research study outcome provides another 
indicator of the study’s robustness and worthiness of the result (BRM, 2019). Reliability 
refers to a study’s level of dependability, consistency, and ability to be repeated in the 
future by other researchers. One measure of reliability is the test-retest method (BRM, 
2019). As the name suggests, this method requires administration of the test instrument 
two or more times during different time frames and the outcomes of the tests can later be 
correlated to demonstrate the stability or reliability over time of the test (BRM, 2019). In 
this study many of the data points available from the Pew research datasets included 
responses to questions obtained during more than a single time frame. This is useful 
because it operates like a built-in reliability test ensuring that there is continuity of 
responses over time.  
A second type of statistical reliability is called instrument reliability, a measure of 
the research study’s instrument (or procedure), that will be used in the data gathering 
phase (Research Rundowns, 2020). Selection of a research instrument is dependent on the 
type of data, unit of analysis, and study design requirements. Evaluation of the instrument 
used to gather date for this study was not applicable because the data was acquired from 
secondary source datasets. However, this study could be susceptible to instrument 
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reliability errors where aggregated data processing is not undertaken correctly so 
reliability testing was used to confirm valid performance.  
Ethical Considerations 
This study had a minimum of ethical considerations. The study did not access 
protected information or confidential data sources. The University IRB application 
approval letter was submitted separately and research was not undertaken until 
permission was granted by the IRB. All data utilized in the study was publicly available 
and could be obtained from non-human sources with no associated identities attached. 
The data in both the thematic analysis and secondary data portions of the study had 
previously passed through the Pew research screening process that include double 
anonymous, confidentiality protections built in (Pew, 2020). All data and associated 
study information was securely stored in a password protected Microsoft cloud storage 
account that is only accessible by me, unless I grant authorization to another. The 
information will remain securely stored for a minimum of seven (7) years and will be 
destroyed at the end of the data holding period.  
Summary 
This research study utilized two different analytical techniques to explore the 
hypothesis that elite theory has a place in security policy creation and security policy 
analysis. The research examined the relationship between privacy sensitivity (as a proxy 
for understanding policy apathy), domestic government mass surveillance spying 
programs, and change in individual behavior. This chapter provided a review of the 
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research methodology, an explanation of the design approach, and a detailed overview of 
the information that was used in the study. A total of nearly 5,000 data points are 
analyzed for pattern and relationship significance resulting in a test of the hypotheses that 




Chapter 4: Results of the Study 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research study was to examine the applicability of elite theory 
as a theoretical tool in social policy modeling and analysis and to investigate whether it 
may accurately anticipate behavior relating to social change. This chapter explains the 
result obtained from an analysis of open source data collected from a United States 
population surveyed on issues of privacy and government monitoring.  
This study is useful because it provides a framework for analyzing the research 
question and assists with understanding the research hypothesis. The results of this study 
contribute to the depository of scholarly literature available to policy professionals who 
create and review new social policy. 
The study was designed to test the hypothesis that elite theory may explain social 
behavior and may be used as a theoretical tool in policy creation and analysis. The 
literature review, study design, and research methodology were developed to contribute 
to existing research on issues of privacy, social policy, and individual action. A thematic 
analysis was used to identify and compare current trend-based patterns of individuals 
across America.  
The research hypothesis suggested that elite theory could be useful in social 
change decision making. The hypothesis was tested by analyzing the relationship 
between individual privacy change and privacy safeguarding behavior during government 
mass surveillance. To explain the data and how it applies to the research inquiry this 
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chapter provides research results in table format, examines the thematic analysis, and 
explains the secondary data analysis. Chapter 5 will summarize the results and integrate 
them into the research inquiry.  
Thematic Analysis  
As mentioned previously, notions of privacy and security are flexible ideas that 
change over time across a society (Mulligan et al., 2016). It is most appropriate to inspect 
the concepts through a wide lens from different perspectives. Privacy, whether social or 
individual continues to occupy an important space in modern life (Mulligan et al., 2016). 
This is especially true as technological advancements erode existing social configurations 
of privacy and individuality while government officials attempt to address modern social 
issues (Mulligan et al., 2016). 
It is paramount that stakeholders have tools to assist with the process of adapting 
new policy to existing sociolegal frameworks. Sociolegal issues around privacy and 
security appear in some of America’s earliest legal cases and continue through present 
day legislation (Green, A. 2020). For this reason, a thematic analysis of relevant legal and 
academic studies was chosen to analyze the variables of government, privacy, and civil 
liberties. To best understand these complex ideas in the context of this paper, 11 studies 
were analyzed alongside 39 data sets using selective coding techniques.  
Significance testing (hypothesis testing) conventionally results in an answer of 
zero or not zero, meaning that there is a statistically not zero significance in the result 
(Lund Research, 2018). The result or effect is not zero and therefore the hypothesis null 
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can be rejected (Lund Research, 2018). The p value indicates that the results observed are 
not statistically by chance (Lund Research, 2018). For example, if an exercise program 
results in muscle gain than the program is significant to gain muscle, though participants 
may only have gained a 1% or less increase in lean mass. However, this method of testing 
does not describe how much muscle was gained or whether those gains are enough to be 
physically noticed. It only informs that there was in fact some correlation between the 
exercise program and a gain in muscle. If one wishes to know whether the exercise 
program will yield a resultant change large enough to be notice in the mirror, this test 
outcome is not sufficient because it neglects to report on objective program effectiveness 
or the magnitude of muscle mass change.  
In contrast, a thematic analysis uses an objective formula applied to emergent 
themes (Mulligan et al., 2016). This method is more robust than that of single-outcome 
method and offers a result based on multiple study outcomes (Mulligan et al., 2016). The 
intent is to capture the result of more than one study and use them to determine whether 
the outcomes are significant (Mulligan et al., 2016). This increases the test power of the 
study and improves effect estimates. It also provides for the reporting of unstandardized 
effect sizes and synthesizes the result of multiple studies providing a single conclusory 
summary (Mulligan et al., 2016).  
In this study, I examined the relationship between awareness of domestic 
government surveillance and changes in individual behavior. This inquiry is addressed by 
a thematic analysis of several different studies to understand how individuals view 
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privacy and respond to privacy changes. The information in other research studies and the 
data provided by the Pew research datasets benefited from a thematic analysis because it 
described multiple case participants over a varied period with changed sample sizes.  
Data Collection  
Table 2 presents existing research and sources used in the thematic analysis.  
Table 2 
Sources for Thematic Analysis 
Name of Source Author Date 
An economic theory of democracy Downs 2003 
Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller 
Government Is Smarter, Second Edition. 
Somin 2016 
Who rules America? Power, politics, & social 
change 
Domhoff 2010 
Your Data Shadow: An exploratory study of the 
short-term effect of viewing news and 
information content on surveillance technologies 
on perceptions of privacy. 
Farid 2015 
Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security 
and Surveillance. 
Madden & Rainie 2015 
Government Surveillance and Internet Search 
Behavior. 
Marthews & Tucker 2017 
Long-term effects of ubiquitous surveillance in 
the home. 
Oulasvirta 2012 
Social pressure, surveillance and community size: 
Evidence from field experiments on voter turnout. 
Panagopoulos 2011 
The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance 
Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-
Americans. 
Sidhu 2007 
After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of 
Surveillance. International Political Sociology. 
Bauman 2014 
Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the 
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America. 
Davis & Silver 2004 
The Conforming Effect: First Amendment 
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling 
Speech.  
Kaminski, Margot, 





Each of these studies was analyzed using thematic analysis to summarize relevant 
qualitative data in a quantitative manner suitable to inform the Pew research data 
discussed below. Step 1 was to review, analyze, and code the texts and step two was to 
sort the coded data into units or related code groups. This procedure was undertaken to 
allow for the initial emergence of identifiable, describable meanings and relationships 
across the research that could be documented and applied to the secondary data sets. 
While the emergence of thematic data in this study does not explain causality or data 
meaning, it may inform the review of the secondary quantitative data analysis and allow 
for a better understanding of statistical results. The process of coding is explained below 
under Themes and Coding. 
Survey Data 
This study used secondary data from public source surveys obtained from the Pew 
research website. Survey materials were in the form of electronic data in question-answer 
format. Each participant responded to the survey and provided an answer to the survey 
question using a Web-based survey form. The survey inquiries, which are describe below 
and attached in the appendices, include relevant topics like privacy, security, government, 
and technology. The data obtained was secured in a password protected cloud vault 
where it will remain for a period of at least 7 years. Access will be limited to me and my 
authorized representative if appropriate.  
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There is no participant identification or personal information associated with the 
data or attached to the research results. While anonymity may be a benefit to the safety of 
the research participants ensuring their identities are protected it did limit my ability to 
attest to the accuracy of the survey question responses. I relied on the representations of 
the participants that they used their best information and reasoned logic to answer each 
survey question accurately and honestly. Any data anomalies or missing data was taken 
into account for purposes of analysis and after careful review of the survey questions, 
answers, and methods of reporting, I am satisfied that the data obtained and provided in 
this research paper is accurate and meets acceptability requirements for dissertation level 
scholarship.  
The first data set is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK Privacy 
Panel Survey #1. The survey was conducted online between January 10, 2014 and 
January 27, 2014 and applied to a sample of N=607 English speaking adults age 18 and 
over who agreed to be part of a group taking online surveys of current issues, some of 
which relate to technology. There were a nationally representative sample of 1,537 
individuals invited to join the panel with 60.8% (935) responding and 64.8% (607) 
agreeing to complete the first of the surveys. The survey data are representative of the 
national population and are based on a random sample of all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia and is adjusted for age, family size, gender, education, and race population 
parameters from the U.S. Census Bureau. The sampling methodology used yields results 
within three points of the actual population values.  
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The panel members were obtained through random digit dialing (RDD) and 
address-based sampling (ABS) methodologies provided by Marketing Systems Group. 
The selected group includes households with cellphone, landline phones, and no phones. 
For those without access to Internet, devices and service were provided to them. The 607 
member sample accounts for current patterns of Internet access, gender, age, education, 
race, income, home ownership, and geography to parameters from the Census Bureau’s 
Current Population Survey (CPS), as adjusted for bias due to nonresponse or 
noncoverage. As a result, the first survey has a sampling error of plus or minus 4.6 
percentage points at a 95% level of confidence. The second and third survey have a 
sampling error of plus or minus 5.6 percentage points. The fourth survey has a sampling 
error of plus or minus 5.8 percentage points. 
The second survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK 
Privacy Panel Survey #2. The survey was conducted online between August 5, 2014 and 
September 2, 2014 and applied to a sample of N=498 English speaking adults age 18 and 
over. The third survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK 
Privacy Panel Survey #3. The survey was conducted online between November 26, 2014 
and January 3, 2015 and applied to a sample of N=475 English speaking adults age 18 
and over. The fourth survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK 
Privacy Panel Survey #4. The survey was conducted online between January 27, 2015 
and February 16, 2015 and applied to a sample of N=461 English speaking adults age 18 
and over.  
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My study was designed to facilitate an understanding of how individuals across 
America view several key areas of personal privacy in consideration of modern 
technology and social trends. This included specific inquiries about information sharing 
and whether respondents believe American citizens should be concerned about 
government monitoring of phone calls, text, and Internet communications.  
The central research inquiry was whether elite theory may serve as a working 
social theory that is applicable to policy-based decision making. The question is 
important because if elite theory is reliable it may be employed by policy professionals 
who review existing policies as well as those tasked with creating new social policy. 
Specifically, if elite theory suggests that it is the elite who control social policy and 
policy can be designed and implemented with little regard for the nonelite population 
(Domhoff, 2010), then policy need only be drafted to fulfill the goal of government and 
the elite stakeholders and not the population. 
My study was guided by secondary data obtained from surveys inquiring how 
individuals view privacy and whether they are invested in securing sensitive information 
or rather, they are uninterested, uninformed, acquiescing, and need not be strongly 
considered during policy evaluation.  
Themes and Coding 
I identified six emergent theme categories from the other research papers using 
thematic coding procedures and then applied each to the survey questions analyzing data 
provided by the participants. I then coded the data by assigning a value to each 
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participant answer based on where the answer fell within each category. For example, 
Question 19 asks participants if they have changed internet or cell phone use in recent 
months to avoid having their activities tracked or noticed. The answers were coded (a) 
not changed; (b) changed; and (c) no answer. They were categorized under “changed 
behavior”. This provided an easily understood categorization of useable data and 
eliminated an otherwise complex range of answers associated with many of the questions. 
The coded survey answers were then combined with other coded data to determine 
participant views of privacy and their behavioral response to government monitoring.  
My analysis of the survey data was designed to test the stated research 
hypotheses. Data were obtained from answers to survey questions administered to a 
randomized population of English-speaking adults. The survey responses used in the 
analysis reflect the ordinal subtypes of the dependent variable (individual privacy 
behavior), in consideration of government monitoring. Responses are represented below 
as percentage answers (x percent of responses within each category). Participant 
responses reveal several emergent themes that are connected to the research question; 
each triangulated and confirmed. The six themes and their associated code are identified 
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Summary 
The research presented in this chapter (data found in Appendix A), are the 
responses of individuals from a randomized population as they go about daily life in an 
environment of domestic governmental monitoring. The data suggest that most 
individuals surveyed do know about government monitoring, have concerns about 
privacy, and indicate that they would like to do more to protect it.  
Although participants describe an ongoing concern for personal privacy and 
believe government surveillance of private citizens should be limited, my research 
suggested that they did not take significant and sustained actions to mitigate government 
surveillance in their personal lives. The research indicated that a majority of people did 
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not significantly shield their exposure to surveillance or change their personal behavior to 
reduce the footprints they leave behind on the surveillance landscape.  
Chapter 5 provides a detailed compilation of the information and data provided in 
the previous chapters including the literature review. It offers an analysis of the data in 
Chapter 4 and provides the reader with a summary of the result. The chapter continues 
with an in-depth interpretation of the findings, recommendations for future research, and 
demonstrates a case for the application of elite theory in addressing a real-world policy 
issue. Finally, I comment on the potential impact of this research on social change and 




Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion 
Overview 
Shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001 the U.S. government initiated 
several new security policies aimed at preventing similar attacks on the United States 
from happening in the future (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). Twenty years later, 
there have been no terror attacks on the United States that were equal in magnitude to the 
9/11 attacks (CNN, 2020). This may be evidence that the changed U.S. national security 
policies have worked though questions persist about the causal relationship between the 
security policy changes and the 20 years that elapsed between 9/11 and now. This is 
especially true in light of comments by a top white house official regarding the efficacy 
of bulk data collection techniques with respect to stopping terrorism wherein he indicated 
that they found none. (see Isikoff, 2013). 
In 2013 a U.S. government contractor named Edward Snowden exposed several 
top-secret domestic spying programs used for bulk data collection and the relationship 
between government data analysis, large corporations, commercial big data, and the 
personal data of every citizen to which the U.S. government had access (Lawfare, 2020).  
The purpose of my study was to explore the relationship between the diminution 
of individual privacy due to those government mass surveillance programs and the 
societal response to it across the national population. I designed the research question to 
investigate whether a fractional loss of an established civil liberty would trigger a 
response within the population (a substantial and sustained increase in privacy protection 
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behavior). My hypothesis was that (in conformance with elite theory), it would not. If 
that were the case one could image that any new or changed security policy need not 
necessarily account for collateral social consequences and that policy could instead focus 
solely on governmental interests.  
Existing literature provided insight into the evolution of individual privacy in 
America and even touched on societal responses associated with changes in 
governmental policy but neglected to address whether elite theory (operating as a modern 
social theory), may be used to suggest social policy change outcomes prior to 
implantation of a new or changed policy. 
Publication of this paper may contribute to a particularized understanding of 
whether policy professionals may rely upon elite theory to assist them as they gauge 
whether or not a policy proposal will drive social action toward an undesirable result. It 
also establishes a base for further academic inquiry into similar areas of research into 
different social theories and their similar use in policy analysis. 
Analysis of the data from this study suggested that a large majority of the 





Figure 1. Question 14 (sp17) 
The data also suggested that individuals believe citizens should be concerned 
about the fact that it is happening: 
 




The data further suggested that respondents themselves are concerned about the 
fact that the government is secretly reviewing information about them: 
 
Figure 3. Question 13 (sp11) 
Most people surveyed disagree or strongly disagree that it is good for someone to 





Figure 4. Question 18 (sp28)  
A majority of those surveyed believed it is unacceptable for the U.S. government 




Figure 5. Question 27 (s14) 
Respondents considered themselves to be mostly private. 
 
Figure 6. Question 23 (sp9) 
They also indicated that the limits on the information that the government can 




Figure 7. Question 18 (sp28) 
 People believed that the government can be trusted some of the time or never. 
 
 
Figure 8. Question 1 (sp2) 
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The anticipated behavioral response of individuals in a population that maintains 
an overall distrust of or have a generally unfavorable view of government would be for 
them to continue or increase privacy shielding behavior(s). A majority of those surveyed 
stated they do not feel that they do enough to protect their private information. 
 
Figure 9. Question 3 (sp6) 
Analysis of the combined survey data suggest that most of the population fit 
within the following criteria: 
• were generally private 
• had knowledge that the government is secretly monitoring them 
• thought that there are not adequate limits on the government 
• believed the government should not be trusted 
• did not think is good for someone to watch their online activity 
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• believed others should be concerned about this  
• were themselves in fact concerned 
Interpretation of the Findings 
This study provided a review of personal privacy in the United States and an 
analysis of population data regarding personal privacy compiled over a multi-year period. 
The study was designed to facilitate a generally applicable result that is reproducible and 
can withstand external scrutiny. Following a thematic analysis of existing studies and the 
statistical analysis of secondary data I was able to extract and interpret several emergent 
themes using a selective coding technique. Ultimately this led me to conclude that the 
null hypothesis may be rejected and that the stated hypothesis may be accepted. 
The data show that U.S. population behavior generally does adhere to the 
elements of elite theory. Individuals across the U.S. hold strong views when it comes to 
personal privacy and freedom from surveillance. Following a disruptive change to 
domestic security policy one may expect significant changes in the public’s collateral 
privacy behavior. However, as described by the elements of elite theory this is not what 
actually happens. My research suggests that people did not always behave in accord with 
their stated views and may not have enacted meaningful behavioral changes to protect 
their privacy. 
A review of the secondary data provided several insights into the U.S. 
population’s perception of government as well as their individual beliefs and behaviors 
following the 2013 Snowden leak. The literature review provided thematic interpretation 
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of the theories behind the observed data. Specially, thematic comparison among studies 
consistently confirmed that individuals are unmoved, uninterested, and remain aloof in 
the long-term following the release of Snowden’s 2013 information about domestic 
government spying.  
This parallels with the expectation of elite theory. In the Sidhu study of Muslims 
after 9/11 it was already known that the government was using several data gathering 
tools including Carnivore, Echelon, and Magic Lantern (although the extent to which 
monitoring was occurring of all US citizens was not known until 2013), to spy on 
citizens. Yet 86.8% of respondents said they had not changed their general activities due 
to a concern that the government may be monitoring them, 65.9% of respondents stated 
that they were not personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who 
changed, in any way, their general activities after 9/11 because of a concern that the 
government may be monitoring their activities, and 89.1% of respondents said they have 
not changed their Internet usage at all, the sites they visit or the amount of time they 
spend on the Internet, after 9/11 due to a concern that the government may be monitoring 
their activities (Sidhu, 2007).  
That study used data acquired following 9/11 and specifically examined Muslims 
(as a group who believe they were to be directly targeted by post-9/11 monitoring). It was 
acknowledged by the author that, “[w]hat accounts for the difference between the belief 
that the government is monitoring the Internet activities of Muslim-Americans and 
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resultant changes in online behavior is unclear” (Sidhu, 2007). My research suggests that 
the answer could be found in a thorough understanding of elite theory. 
In the Marthews and Tucker 2017 study where the authors reported that there was 
variation in search engine query following the 2013 Snowden leak, the data involved a 
limited subset of search terms comprised of high levels of sensitivity. It makes sense that 
a downturn in search volume would occur in ‘sensitive searches’ after people just learned 
that the government was watching their Google queries. This response is even anticipated 
by the Oulasvirta and study that suggested when there is a temporary adjustment to new 
(changed), surveillance monitoring the population will adapt and regress to pre-change 
behavior. Again, these results are expected by elite theory. 
Summary of the Findings 
 The overarching role of this research study was to provide policy 
professionals with an insight into whether elite theory may be relied upon when decision 
makers consider a population’s response to the implementation of new social policy. The 
study results suggested that elite theory is a useful social theory that may be capable of 
indicating behavioral outcomes to new or different social policy.  
The null hypothesis or default assumption of my research asserted that when the 
U.S. population realizes the government is seriously infringing upon an established 
liberty (secretly spying on them having surreptitiously inserted mass domestic 
surveillance into virtually every aspect of their private life), it will change and adopt 
some affirmative protective behavior in response. The data suggested that this null 
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hypothesis may be rejected and that a majority of the population does not substantially 
alter behavior or adopt permanent protective measures in response to policy changes.  
Coding theme B (no-change responses) as 2 or above and theme A (yes-change 
responses) as 1; I obtained mean scores for all the change responses as follows:  
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
SMEAN(Q19_p2_sp9) 498 3 2 .428 .183 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11a) 498 4 2 .684 .468 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11b) 498 4 2 .582 .338 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11c) 498 4 2 .673 .453 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11d) 498 4 2 .669 .448 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11e) 498 4 1 .674 .454 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11f) 498 4 2 .624 .389 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11g) 498 4 2 .564 .318 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11h) 498 4 2 .688 .474 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11i) 498 4 2 .735 .541 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11j) 498 4 2 .652 .425 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11k) 498 4 2 .603 .364 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11l) 498 4 2 .648 .420 
SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11m) 498 4 1 .711 .505 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29b) 498 3 3 .835 .697 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29c) 498 3 4 .671 .450 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29d) 498 3 3 .814 .663 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29e) 498 3 3 .799 .638 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29f) 498 3 3 .765 .586 
SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29g) 498 3 3 .855 .732 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32a) 498 3 3 .819 .671 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32b) 498 3 3 .718 .516 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32c) 498 3 3 .881 .776 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32d) 498 3 3 .895 .800 
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SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32e) 498 3 3 .649 .421 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32f) 498 3 3 .719 .517 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32g) 498 3 3 .829 .687 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32h) 498 3 3 .796 .633 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32i) 498 3 3 .646 .418 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32j) 498 3 3 .722 .522 
SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32k) 498 3 3 .738 .545 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35a) 498 3 3 .708 .501 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35b) 498 3 3 .603 .364 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35c) 498 3 3 .592 .351 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35d) 498 3 2 .825 .681 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35e) 498 3 3 .651 .424 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35f) 498 3 3 .733 .537 
SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35i) 498 3 3 .616 .379 
Valid N (listwise) 498     
As this tables demonstrates, of the data samples collected there were only two samples 
that indicated a change behavior. All other samples indicate no change in behavior was 
identified. 
Additional Research  
Several questions related to issues of security policy and social change are ripe for 
additional inquiry. As of the writing of this paper there have been no publicly reported 
mass terror incidents anywhere on the globe similar in magnitude to those that occurred 
in the U.S. on 9/11 (CNN, 2020). Is this attributable to America’s changed national 
security policies over the past twenty years? If so, was the reduction in civil liberties a 
reasonable tradeoff? Must those policies continue or even be amplified to maintain 
domestic safety? Was 9/11 a one-off that would not have repeated even if intrusive 
government monitoring programs were not employed? What happens to civil rights if 
another 9/11 type-event occurs? How would security policy change again? To what 
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extent would the civil liberties of citizens change? My research did not address these 
questions or the assumption that increased monitoring of the population by the 
government causally effects citizen safety in a significant and positively correlated way 
and all of these questions remain.  
If the 2013 Snowden leak or similar release of classified information had not 
occurred, I would not have been able to undertake this research and American society 
would likely have remained in the dark with respect to these questions. Twenty years 
after 9/11 and seven years after the Snowden leak, the public is still not privy to details of 
national security policy or its true effectiveness because it remains classified and 
insulated from public inquiry. While my research has shown that privacy and civil 
liberties have decreased and the government has more information than ever about each 
one of us, there is no data, no statistics, no transparency, no way to quantify security 
policy effectiveness without additional information releases.  
Social Change and Future Public Policy Implications 
The research question addressed in this paper goes well beyond whether citizens 
will accept losses of civil liberties in exchange for perceived increases of general 
security. I inquired whether the input of millions of nonelites matter at all. Elite theory 
seems to suggest that the nonelite public have little to no regard for policy and that over 
time even the majority of those with strongly held policy contradicting beliefs will adapt 




In the years following the start of this dissertation and after media coverage of 
dozens of mass shooting incidents occurring since 2014 (defined as a shooting involving 
three or more fatalities), increasing numbers of Americas voiced support of stricter 
national gun control policies. In response to those incidents U.S. government officials 
proposed several new or modified policies regarding legal gun ownership. Most notable 
was an official policy statement that guns should be outlawed and even confiscated from 
lawful U.S. owners (Biden, 2020). 
While many of the proposals are probably unconstitutional and may be politically 
motivated others represent serious strategies for closing purchasing loopholes and 
decreasing ease of access to potential non-lawful owners. As a result, policy professionals 
may use theoretical tools to make educated estimations regarding gun control policy 
outcomes. According to my research if policy can be justified through general threats to 
safety the collateral social consequences need not require exceptional scrutiny by policy 
makers. 
If lawful gun owners reject new or changed regulation and even forced 
confiscation my research suggests a majority of individuals will adapt and acquiescence. 
As goes the case for a reduction in a civil liberty like privacy may go the case for a 
reduction in 2nd Amendment rights. One may expect that some gun owners would exhibit 
defiance (similar to the few individuals who attempt to anonymize their data footprint), 




In early March 2020, the United States was faced with responding to the 
Pandemic disease COVID-19. Among the (very delayed), policies implemented by the 
U.S. government in an attempt to minimize and mitigate the harm done by virus spread 
was the wearing of masks and the virtual lockdown of travel and small businesses by 
federal and state officials. Many legal safeguards were abandoned in the name of health 
and safety as State governors exercised orders of increasingly strict measures in order to 
protect the public from itself. In an April, 2020 interview on the Fox News channel by 
Tucker Carlson, the New Jersey state Governor stated that, “I wasn’t thinking of the Bill 
of Rights when we did this…”. An admission from the highest-ranking authority in the 
State of New Jersey that policies were put into place without concern for civil legal 
protections. 
As predicted by the results of this research, while some individuals initially 
voiced concerns against lockdowns and mask wearing the vast majority acquiesced 
despite contradictory indicators and lacking scientific evidence. By late September, 2020 
daily masking wearing become normalized and business offered many different styles for 
consumers to purchase. These social policy examples of gun control, quarantine, and 
mask wearing exemplify additional areas of policy beside privacy to which this area of 
research may be applicable.  
The research results indicated in this paper do not suggest that policy 
professionals must or even should incorporate elite theory into decision making. Rather, 
my intention was to offer this research as guidance to other academics and researchers 
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Appendix A: Tables 
A total of 607 participants provided data for the privacy survey and there were 39 
questions used in the analysis. Each question was coded with one of three possible 
outcomes creating a total of 117 coded data points for review. The following questions 
were obtained from Survey 1 and represent a percent of total answers.  
Table A5 
Question 1. (sp2) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Just About Always 2% A  
 Most of the Time 16% A  
 Only Some of the Time 67% B  
 Never 14% B  
 Refused 1% C  
     





Question 2. (sp7) Thinking about your daily life, when you have private information that 
you would like to share with another trusted person or organization, how secure do you 
feel [using the following devices or methods]?  
a. Telephone line 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 16% A  
 Somewhat Secure 51% A  
 Not Very Secure 19% B  
 Not at All Secure 12% B  
 Refused 1% C  
     





 b. Cell phone 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 9% A  
 Somewhat Secure 43% A  
 Not Very Secure 29% B  
 Not at All Secure 17% B  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question. 
Table A8 
 c. Text message 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 7% A  
 Somewhat Secure 32% A  
 Not Very Secure 37% B  
 Not at All Secure 22% B  
 Refused 7% C  
     





 d. Email 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 5% A  
 Somewhat Secure 35% A  
 Not Very Secure 36% B  
 Not at All Secure 21% B  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question 
Table A10 
 e. Chat or Instant messenger 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 4% A  
 Somewhat Secure 25% A  
 Not Very Secure 36% B  
 Not at All Secure 32% B  
 Refused 3% C  
     





 f. Social media sites 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Secure 2% A  
 Somewhat Secure 14% A  
 Not Very Secure 28% B  
 Not at All Secure 53% B  
 Refused 3% C  
     
Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question  
Table 12 
Question 3. (sp6) Do you feel as though you already do enough to protect the privacy of 
your personal information online, or do you feel as though you would like to do more? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 I Already do Enough 37% A  
 Would Like to do More 61% B  
 Refused 1% C  
     





Question 4. (sp8) We’d now like to know how you feel about a range of information that 
others might learn about you in daily life. For each kind of information, please indicate 
how sensitive you consider that information to be – even if some people and 
organizations already have access to it. 
a. Purchasing habits 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 8% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 33% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 44% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 14% A  
 Refused 1% C  
     





b. Who your friends are and what they are like 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 22% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 46% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 23% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 7% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 15 
 c. Details of physical location over time from cellphone data 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 50% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 32% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 11% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 5% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





 d. State of your health and the medicines you take 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 55% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 26% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 12% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 5% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 17 
 e. Political views and the candidate you support 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 20% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 31% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 30% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 17% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 5. (sp8) For each kind of information, please indicate how sensitive you 
consider that information to be – even if some people and organizations already have 
access to it. 
a. Media you like: tastes in music, movies, books, websites, magazines. 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 9% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 22% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 45% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 21% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





 b. Numbers you have called or texted from your phone 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 45% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 30% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 16% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 6% A  
 Refused 3% C  
     
Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question. 
Table 20 
 c. Your religion or spiritual views 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 22% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 23% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 29% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 25% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





 d. Your relationship history, including people you have dated or were 
romantically involved with in the past 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 40% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 31% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 14% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 12% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 6. (sp8) For each kind of information, please indicate how sensitive you 
consider that information to be – even if some people and organizations already have 
access to it. 
 a. Your birthdate 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 41% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 25% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 19% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 14% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





b. Your social security number 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 90% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 5% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 2% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 1% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 24 
c. Websites you have visited 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 27% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 43% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 20% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 8% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





d. Searches you have made using online search engines 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 24% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 41% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 22% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 10% A  
 Refused 3% C  
     
Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 26 
e. Content of your email messages 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 52% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 25% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 13% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 7% A  
 Refused 3% C  
     





f. Content of your text messages 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 49% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 26% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 13% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 8% A  
 Refused 4% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 28 
g. Content of your phone conversations 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very Sensitive 54% B  
 Somewhat Sensitive 27% B  
 Not Too Sensitive 13% A  
 Not at all Sensitive 4% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 7. (sp9) Some people aren’t too worried about privacy today and others are 
concerned about privacy. We’d like to know how you feel about the topic. For each of the 
following statements please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree. 
 a. It is easy for me to be anonymous online 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 3% A  
 Agree 20% A  
 Disagree 52% B  
 Strongly Disagree 22% B  
 Refused 2% C  
     





 b. I am willing to share some information about myself with companies in order to 
use online services for free 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 4% A  
 Agree 51% A  
 Disagree 31% B  
 Strongly Disagree 11% B  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 31 
Question 8. (sp9) f. When I meet new people, I assume that they might search for 
information about me on the internet 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 10% B  
 Agree 37% B  
 Disagree 40% A  
 Strongly Disagree 11% A  
 Refused 3% C  
     




Question 9. (sp9) If inaccurate information about me got posted online, it would be very 
difficult to get it removed 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 39% B  
 Agree 49% B  
 Disagree 9% A  
 Strongly Disagree 1% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  
Table 33 
Question 10. (sp9) It is a good thing for society if people believe that someone is keeping 
an eye on things that they do online 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 7% A  
 Agree 29% A  
 Disagree 42% B  
 Strongly Disagree 20% B  
 Refused 2% C  
     




Question 11. (sp9) American citizens should be concerned about the government’s 
monitoring of phone calls and internet communications 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Strongly Agree 40% B  
 Agree 39% B  
 Disagree 16% A  
 Strongly Disagree 2% A  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 12. (sp10) How concerned are you, if at all, that some of the information you 
share on social networking sites might be accessed by third party advertisers or 
businesses without your knowledge? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 35% B  
 Somewhat concerned 45% B  
 Not too concerned 17% A  







     





Question 13. (sp11) How concerned are you, if at all, that some of the information you 
share on social networking sites might be accessed by the government without your 
knowledge? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 37% B  
 Somewhat concerned 34% B  
 Not too concerned 25% A  







     





Question 14 (sp17). How much, if anything, have you heard about the government 
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as 
part of efforts to monitor terrorist activity? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 A lot 43% A  
 A little 44% A  
 Nothing at all 5% B  
 Don’t know 6% C  
 Refused 2% C  
     
Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.  





Question 15: (sp3) Let’s think about a typical day in your life as you spend time at home, 
outside your home, and getting from place to place. You use your cellphone and maybe 
landline phones. You may use credit cards. You might go online and buy things, use 
search engines, watch videos, or check in on social media. As you go through a typical 
day, how much control do you feel you have over how much information is collected 
about you and how it is being used? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 A lot of control 9% A  
 Some control 38% A  
 Not much control 37% B  
 No control at all 13% B  
 Refused 3% C  
     





Question 16: (sp7) How much, if anything, have you heard about the government 
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as 
part of the efforts to monitor terrorist activity?  
 Answer Percentage Code  
 A lot 32% A  
 A little 48% A  
 Nothing at all 7% B  
 Don’t know 6% C  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 17: (sp27) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the government’s 
collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Approve 32% A  
 Disapprove 40% B  
 Don’t know 26% C  
 Refused 2% C  
     





Question 18: (sp28) Thinking about the data the government collects a part of anti-
terrorism efforts… Do you think there are adequate limits on what telephone and 
internet data the government can collect, or not? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Yes, there are adequate 
limits on what 
government can collect 
31% A  
 No, there are adequate 
limits on what 











     





Question 19: (sp9) Have you changed your internet or cell phone use in recent months in 
any way to avoid having your activities tracked or noticed, or haven’t you done 
this? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Yes 7% B  
 No 91% A  
 Refused 3% C  
     
































      
a. Used a temporary username or email 
address 
25 56 9 5 3 
b. Added a privacy enhancing browser 
plugin like DoNotTrackMe or Privacy 
Badger 
9 72 8 8 3 
c. Given inaccurate or misleading 
information about yourself 
24 60 7 6 3 
d. Set your browser to disable or turned off 
cookies 
34 43 8 12 3 
e. Cleared cookies and browser history 59 22 7 8 3 
f. Used a service that allows you to browse 
the web anonymously, such as a proxy 
server, Tor software, or VPN 
9 67 9 10 4 
g. Encrypted your phone calls, text 
messages or email 
10 68 10 10 3 
h. Decided not to use a website because 
they asked for you real name 
23 55 12 7 3 
i. Deleted or edited something you posted 
in the past 
29 46 14 8 3 
j. Asked someone to remove something 
posted about you 
11 63 15 7 3 
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k. Used a public computer to browse 
anonymously 
12 68 12 6 3 
l. Used a search engine that doesn’t keep 
track of your search history 
15 52 11 19 3 
m. Refused to provide information about 
yourself that wasn’t relevant to the 
transaction 
57 23 9 8 3 
     
Notes. A total of 495 of 498 respondents answered this question. 
Table 44 
Question 21: (sp12) Do you think people should have the ability to use the internet 
completely anonymously for certain kinds of online activities? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Yes 55 B  
 No 16 A  
 Don’t know 27 C  
 Refused 2 C  
     
Notes. A total of 496 of 498 respondents answered this question.  





Question 22: (sp7) When an app on your smartphone or tablet seeks your permission to 
use your location, how often do you allow it to use your location? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Frequently 22 A  
 Sometimes 36 A  
 Hardly ever 28 B  
 Never 11 B  
 Refused / not asked 3 C  
     





Question 23: (sp9) Which of these statements accurately describes you? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 I am generally a private 
person and like to keep 
to myself 
65 B  
 I am generally an open 
person who enjoys 
sharing with others 
34 A  
 Refused 1 C  
     





Question 24: (sp10) How much, if anything, have you heard about the government 
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as 
part of the efforts to monitor terrorist activity?  
 Answer Percentage Code  
 A lot 31 A  
 A little 56 A  
 Nothing at all 6 B  
 Don’t know 6 C  
 Refused 1 C  
     
Notes. A total of 474 of 475 respondents answered this question. 
Table 48 
Question 25: (sp12) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American  
government to monitor communications from individuals suspected of terrorist activities? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Acceptable 82 A  
 Unacceptable 15 B  
 Refused 2 C  
     





Question 26: (sp13) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American  
government to monitor communications from American leaders? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Acceptable 60 A  
 Unacceptable 38 B  
 Refused 2 C  
     
Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.  
Table 50 
Question 27: (sp14) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American  
government to monitor communications from American citizens? 
 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Acceptable 40 A  
 Unacceptable 57 B  
 Refused 3 C  
     





Question 28: (sp15) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American  
government to monitor communications from citizens of other countries? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Acceptable 54 A  
 Unacceptable 44 B  
 Refused 2 C  
     
Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.  
Table 52 
Question 29: (sp16) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American  
government to monitor communications from leaders of other countries? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Acceptable 60 A  
 Unacceptable 37 B  
 Refused 3 C  
     





Question 30: (sp17) Overall, how concerned are you about government surveillance of  
American’s data and electronic communications? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 17 B  
 Somewhat concerned 35 B  
 Not very concerned 33 A  
 Not at all concerned 13 A  
 Refused 2 C  
     
Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.  
Table 54 
Question 31: (sp20) Do you generally think the courts and judges do a good job 
balancing the public’s right to privacy and the needs of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to collect information for investigations? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Yes 48 A  
 No 49 B  
 Refused 3 C  
     





Question 32: (sp21) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your 
activity on social media websites such as Facebook or Twitter? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 14 B  
 Somewhat concerned 17 B  
 Not very concerned 24 A  
 Not at all concerned 24 A  
 Not applicable 19 C  
     
Notes. A total of 454 of 475 respondents answered this question.  
Table 56 
Question 33: (sp22) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your 
activity on search engines? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 15 B  
 Somewhat concerned 24 B  
 Not very concerned 30 A  
 Not at all concerned 23 A  
 Not applicable 5 C  
     




Question 34: (sp24) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your 
activity on your cell phone? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 17 B  
 Somewhat concerned 20 B  
 Not very concerned 30 A  
 Not at all concerned 24 A  
 Not applicable 7 C  
     
Notes. A total of 465 of 475 respondents answered this question.  
Table 58 
Question 35: (sp26) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your 
activity on your mobile apps? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 12 B  
 Somewhat concerned 17 B  
 Not very concerned 28 A  
 Not at all concerned 22 A  
 Not applicable 19 C  
     




Question 36: (sp27) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your 
activity on your email? 
 Answer Percentage Code  
 Very concerned 19 B  
 Somewhat concerned 19 B  
 Not very concerned 31 A  
 Not at all concerned 23 A  
 Not applicable 4 C  
     





Question 37: (sp29) Since learning about U.S. phone and internet monitoring, how much, 


























7 7 18 45 22 1 
b. Search 
engines 




5 4 17 51 23 <1 
d. Your cell 
phone 
7 7 23 57 5 1 
e. Text 
messages 
7 6 19 53 15 0 
f. Mobile 
apps 




8 10 23 57 2 1 
     





Question 38: (sp32) Since learning about the government’s phone and internet 
monitoring programs, have you done any of the following in an effort to hide or 














I have not 


























      
a. Unfriended or 
unfollowed 
people on social 
media 
13 8 52 26 1 
b. Deleted social 
media accounts 
8 9 58 24 1 
c. Used social 
media less often 
15 9 50 24 <1 
d. Changed your 
privacy settings 
on social media 
17 10 47 24 1 





8 10 70 11 1 
f. Avoided using 
certain terms in 
online 
communications 
13 10 67 9 1 
g. Avoided certain 
apps 





13 5 57 25 1 
i. Used 
pseudonyms 
8 6 68 16 1 
j. Not used certain 





11 13 64 11 1 




online or over 
the phone 
14 9 67 9 1 
     





Question 39: (sp35) Since learning about U.S. phone and internet monitoring, have you 
adopted any of the following tools or strategies to make your communications and 




















































       
a. Used a 
search engine 
that doesn’t 
keep track of 
your search 
history 




such as PGP 




calls or text 
messages 
4 8 48 24 15 2 
d. Used more 
complex 
passwords 








































2 5 40 39 13 1 
       
 





Question 40: (sp37) Is it acceptable or unacceptable for the government to monitor the  













    
Visited a child pornography site 77 19 4 
Was reported by a bank to be making unusual 
withdraws 
51 45 4 
Made search engine inquires for the keyword 
explosives and automatic weapons 
65 30 4 
Visited websites of known anti-American 
groups 
67 29 4 
Exchanged emails with an Imam who preached 
against infidels 
68 28 4 
Used encryption software to hide files 49 47 4 
     
Notes. A total of 475 respondents answered this question. 





Question 41: (sp1) Privacy means different things to different people today. In thinking 
about all of your daily interactions—both online and offline—please tell me how 
























       







74 19 3 1 1 2 
b. Not having 
someone 
watch you 





























































      




Appendix B: Figures 
 
Figure B10. Question 19 (sp9) 
 






Figure B12. Question 20 (sp11) c 
 












* the responses to this question appear to contraindicate the responses to the other 
questions in the same category. I believe this is due to the phrasing of the question; that is 
clearing cookies or browser history is not necessarily privacy related. Cyber professionals 
and computer system-health software routinely undertake these tasks for non-privacy 
related reasons.  
 






Figure B16. Question 20 (sp11) g 
 
 






Figure B18. Question 20 (sp11) i 
 





Figure b20. Question 20 (sp11) k 
 
 





Figure B22. Question 20 (sp11) m 
 
Figure B23. Question 37 (sp29) b. (contraindicative result could be due to the vagueness 





Figure B24. Question 37 (sp29) c. 
 





Figure B26. Question 37 (sp29) e. 
 





Figure B28. Question 37 (sp29) g. 
 
 




Figure B30. Question 38 (sp32) b. 
 
 













Figure B34. Question 38 (sp32) f. 
 
 






Figure B36. Question 38 (sp32) h. 
 












Figure B40. Question 39 (sp35) a. 
 
 





Figure B42. Question 39 (sp35) c. 
 
 





Figure B44. Question 39 (sp35) e. 
 
 





Figure B46. Question 39 (sp35) i. 
 
Figure B47. Question 39 (sp35) j. 
 
